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Ignorance matters

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Amanda Royka Open the ORCID record for Amanda Royka [Opens in a new window]  and
Julian Jara-Ettinger
Amanda Royka
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA. amanda.royka@yale.edu; julian.jara-ettinger@yale.edu; https://compdevlab.yale.edu/
Julian Jara-Ettinger
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8205, USA. amanda.royka@yale.edu; julian.jara-ettinger@yale.edu; https://compdevlab.yale.edu/
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Abstract

The ability to reason about ignorance is an important and often overlooked representational capacity. Phillips and colleagues assume that knowledge representations are inevitably accompanied by ignorance representations. We argue that this is not necessarily the case, as agents who can reason about knowledge often fail on ignorance tasks, suggesting that ignorance should be studied as a separate representational capacity.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e167
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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