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So far, we have assumed that players have complete information about economic environments. This assumption is stringent when we want to analyse bargaining situations in the real world. There are many uncertain events in actual bargaining problems. Players have only imperfect information on uncertainties. Furthermore, they have different information. In such situations, it is said that players have incomplete information, which is also called asymmetric information when we want to emphasise the asymmetry of players’ information.
This section presents non-cooperative bargaining models for n-person pure bargaining games in Section 3.1. Initiated by the seminal work of Rubinstein (1982), the bargaining models have a sequential structure in which some player proposes a payoff allocation, and all other players sequentially respond to it. Bargaining continues until an agreement is made. A rule that selects a proposer is called a bargaining protocol. The relationship between non-cooperative equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution is considered.
The Multiple Price List (MPL) and Switching Multiple Price List (sMPL) provide a useful framework for estimating preference parameters, most usually risk aversion, from a sample of experimental subjects or survey respondents. In this paper, we consider designs in which more than one sMPL is presented to each subject, allowing more than one preference parameter to be estimated simultanously, and we propose a consistent estimator in this setting – the Multivariate Heterogeneous Preference (MHP) estimator. Focusing on the bivariate case of two sMPLs and two preference parameters, we demonstrate that non-standard econometric techniques, namely Monte Carlo integration with importance sampling, are required to implement the MHP estimator. Via a Monte Carlo exercise, we show that our estimator has good finite-sample properties. Finally, we apply the MHP estimator to a real data set and compare the estimates to those obtained using an inconsistent estimator applied in previous studies.
We first introduce a cooperative game where players cannot form any coalition other than the grand coalition. The only possible outcome is that all players cooperate or that no players cooperate.
This book aims to present some of the recent developments in the studies of coalition formation in game theory through bridging non-cooperative and cooperative approaches.
Income inequality is a structural feature in Argentina. This paper advances a relatively underexplored analytical framework that links sectoral disparities in profit rates to differences in union organisation and state intervention. We identify three interrelated dimensions: (a) uneven capital accumulation across sectors, captured by profit rates as an upper bound on wage growth; (b) workers’ collective organisation and bargaining capacity, which shape the extent to which this potential is realised; and (c) the role of the state as a contested arena in which distributive conflicts are mediated. Using panel data econometric models (2006–2019), we examine average wages across private economic sectors, accounting for sectoral profit rates, union strength, and minimum wage policies. Our findings reveal that wage inequality emerges from the interaction between capital’s drive for profit maximisation and workers’ responses through organisation, bargaining, and conflict.
American economic historians generally believe that U.S. modern economic growth began before 1840, was broadly based, and the acceleration was gradual. These claims are treated as conjectures rather than solid conclusions because the census did not publish good economic data before 1840. But the earlier period was not a “statistical dark age,” as sometimes asserted. After 1817, systematic statistics on postal activity were available at the local level at high frequencies. These data shed light on the timing and sources of the onset of modern economic growth, the patterns of regional development, and the spread of a culture of communication.
This study explores the impact of a development project, the Maya Train, on the lives of rural youth in Tenosique, Mexico, focusing on their cultural practices and territorial identities amid urban and rural dynamics. It highlights how traditional and modern elements blend in young people’s daily lives, affecting their identities and future aspirations in the face of socioeconomic and environmental changes. The need for public policies that recognize the diversity of rural youth is emphasized, suggesting a reevaluation of social science categories to better understand the complexity of youth and rurality in development contexts. This research underscores the importance of incorporating youth perspectives into sustainable development strategies.
When the actions of one player affect the environment of another player, we say that there are externalities. In economics, two types of externalities are often discussed: consumption and production externalities. The former externality describes a situation where a player’s utility function is directly affected by another player’s actions (playing loud music). The latter describes a situation where the production function of a player is directly affected by another player’s actions (polluting). Externalities may arise in economies through public goods, common-pool resources, technological spillover, strategic interactions, and so on.
The prevalence of conspiracy theories is a concern in western countries, yet the phenomenon is rarely addressed in experimental economics. In two preregistered online studies (NStudy 1 = 97, NStudy 2 = 203) we examine the relationship between exposure to conspiracy modes of thinking, self-reported conspiracy mentality, self-reported manipulativeness, and behaviour in an economic game that measures strategic sophistication. Part of our design was based on Balafoutas et al. (2021), who found a positive relationship between exposure to conspiracy modes of thinking and strategic sophistication. Our results did not corroborate their findings in an online setting. Our measures of conspiracy mentality were modestly correlated with strategic sophistication in Study 2, but not in Study 1. Although we expected manipulativeness to be positively associated with both conspiracy mentality and strategic sophistication—thereby linking conspiracy mentality and strategic sophistication indirectly—it was only associated with conspiracy mentality.
Although the spatial dimension is embedded in most issues studied by environmental and resource economics, its incorporation into economic models is not widespread. As a result, significant aspects of important problems remain hidden, which could lead to policy failures. This Element fills this gap by exploring how space can be integrated into environmental and resource economics. The emergence of spatial patterns in economic models through Turing's mechanism is explained and an extension of Pontryagin's maximum principle under spatial dynamics is provided. Examples of the use of spatial dynamics serve to illustrate why space matters in environmental policy design. Moreover, the differentiation of policy when spatial transport mechanisms are considered is made clear. The tools presented, along with their applications, provide foundations for future research in spatial environmental and resource economics in which the underlying spatial dimension – which is very real – is fully taken into account.