Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-hfldf Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-15T01:30:36.963Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A good architecture for fast and slow thinking, but exclusivity is exclusively in the past

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Keith E. Stanovich Open the ORCID record for Keith E. Stanovich [Opens in a new window]  and
Maggie E. Toplak Open the ORCID record for Maggie E. Toplak [Opens in a new window]
Keith E. Stanovich
Affiliation:
Department of Applied Psychology and Human Development, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada keith.stanovich@utoronto.ca http://keithstanovich.com/Site/Home.html
Maggie E. Toplak
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, LaMarsh Centre for Child and Youth Research, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada mtoplak@yorku.ca http://maggietoplak.com/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

No doubt older work in the dual-process tradition overemphasized the importance and frequency of the override function, and the working model in this target article provides a useful corrective. The attempt to motivate the model using the so-called exclusivity assumption is unnecessary, because no recent dual-process model in the reasoning literature has rested strongly on this assumption.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e142
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017). Fast logic? Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory. Cognition, 158, 90–109.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
De Neys, W., & Pennycook, G. (2019). Logic, fast and slow: Advances in dual-process theorizing. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 28, 503–509.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). In two minds: Dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454–459.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2019). Reflections on reflection: The nature and function of type 2 processes in dual-process theories of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 25, 383–415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223–241.10.1177/1745691612460685CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
LaBerge, D., & Samuels, S. J. (1974). Toward a theory of automatic information processing in reading. Cognitive Psychology, 6, 293–323.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newman, I. R., Gibb, M., & Thompson, V. A. (2017). Rule-based reasoning is fast and belief-based reasoning can be slow. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43, 1154–1170.Google ScholarPubMed
Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control. In Solso, R. L. (Ed.), Information processing and cognition: The Loyola symposium (pp. 55–85). Wiley.Google Scholar
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature, 489, 427–430.10.1038/nature11467CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. Psychological Review, 84, 127–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanovich, K. E. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Erlbaum.10.4324/9781410603432CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanovich, K. E. (2004). The robot's rebellion: Finding meaning in the age of Darwin. University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanovich, K. E. (2009). Distinguishing the reflective, algorithmic, and autonomous minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? In Evans, J. & Frankish, K. (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond (pp. 55–88). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanovich, K. E. (2018). Miserliness in human cognition: The interaction of detection, override and mindware. Thinking & Reasoning, 24, 423–444.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–726.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Trippas, D., Thompson, V. A., & Handley, S. J. (2017). When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias. Memory & Cognition, 45, 539–552.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed