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Switching between system 1 and system 2: The nature of competing intuitions and the role of disfluency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Maryna Kołeczek Open the ORCID record for Maryna Kołeczek [Opens in a new window]  and
Maciej Sekerdej Open the ORCID record for Maciej Sekerdej [Opens in a new window]
Maryna Kołeczek
Affiliation:
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland m.koleczek@student.uj.edu.pl; maciej.sekerdej@uj.edu.pl
Maciej Sekerdej
Affiliation:
Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland m.koleczek@student.uj.edu.pl; maciej.sekerdej@uj.edu.pl
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Abstract

This commentary identifies two problems concerning the switch mechanism: The model explains too few instances of switching, and the switching mechanism itself seems fallible. The improvements we suggest are to clarify the nature of the competing intuitions as the initial intuition and its negation or alternative ways to solve the problem, and to incorporate cognitive disfluency into the switching mechanism.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e127
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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