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More than two intuitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

David J. Grüning
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany david.gruening@psychologie.uni-heidelberg.de Department of Survey Design and Methodology, GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Mannheim, Germany
Joachim I. Krueger
Affiliation:
Cognitive, Linguistic & Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA joachim_krueger@brown.edu

Abstract

We consider an underdeveloped feature of De Neys's model. Decisions with multiple intuitions per option are neither trivial to explain nor rare. These decision scenarios are crucial for an assessment of the model's generalizability and adequacy. Besides monitoring absolute differences in intuition strength, the mind might add the strengths of intuitions per choice option, leading to competing and testable hypotheses.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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