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Unifying theories of reasoning and decision making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Brett K. Hayes
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia b.hayes@unsw.edu.au https://www.unsw.edu.au/staff/brett-hayes
Rachel G. Stephens
Affiliation:
University of Adelaide, Adelaide, Australia rachel.stephens@adelaide.edu.au
John C. Dunn
Affiliation:
University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia john.dunn@uwa.edu.au

Abstract

De Neys offers a welcome departure from the dual-process accounts that have dominated theorizing about reasoning. However, we see little justification for retaining the distinction between intuition and deliberation. Instead, reasoning can be treated as a case of multiple-cue decision making. Reasoning phenomena can then be explained by decision-making models that supply the processing details missing from De Neys's framework.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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