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Illusory intuitions: Challenging the claim of non-exclusivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Simon J. Handley Open the ORCID record for Simon J. Handley [Opens in a new window] ,
Omid Ghasemi Open the ORCID record for Omid Ghasemi [Opens in a new window]  and
Michal Bialek
Simon J. Handley
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Macquarie Park, NSW, Australia simon.handley@mq.edu.au https://researchers.mq.edu.au/en/persons/simon-handley
Omid Ghasemi
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia o.ghasemi@unsw.edu.au https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=LyL_5s8AAAAJ&hl=en
Michal Bialek
Affiliation:
Institute of Psychology, University of Wroclaw, Wrocław, Poland michal.bialek3@uwr.edu.pl https://sites.google.com/view/michalbialek
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Abstract

A person who arrives at correct solutions via false premises is right and wrong simultaneously. Similarly, a person who generates “logical intuitions” through superficial heuristics can likewise be right and wrong at the same time. However, heuristics aren't guaranteed to deliver the logical solution, so the claim that system 1 can routinely produce the alleged system 2 response is unfounded.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e125
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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