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A tale of two histories: Dual-system architectures in modular perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

John Zerilli Open the ORCID record for John Zerilli [Opens in a new window]
John Zerilli*
Affiliation:
Old College, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK john.zerilli@ed.ac.uk https://www.law.ed.ac.uk/people/dr-john-zerilli
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Abstract

I draw parallels and contrasts between dual-system and modular approaches to cognition, the latter standing to inherit the same problems De Neys identifies regarding the former. Despite these two literatures rarely coming into contact, I provide one example of how he might gain theoretical leverage on the details of his “non-exclusivity” claim by paying closer attention to the modularity debate.

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Open Peer Commentary
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e145
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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