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The dual-system approach is a useful heuristic but does not accurately describe behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Jeffrey W. Sherman  and
Samuel A. W. Klein
Jeffrey W. Sherman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA jsherman@ucdavis.edu https://socolab.faculty.ucdavis.edu/ sawklein@ucdavis.edu
Samuel A. W. Klein
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA, USA jsherman@ucdavis.edu https://socolab.faculty.ucdavis.edu/ sawklein@ucdavis.edu
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Abstract

We argue that the dual-system approach and, particularly, the default-interventionist framework favored by De Neys unnecessarily constrains process models, limiting their range of application. In turn, the accommodations De Neys makes for these constraints raise questions of parsimony and falsifiability. We conclude that the extent to which processes possess features of system 1 versus system 2 must be tested empirically.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e139
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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