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A view from mindreading on fast-and-slow thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Jason Low ,
Stephen A. Butterfill Open the ORCID record for Stephen A. Butterfill [Opens in a new window]  and
John Michael Open the ORCID record for John Michael [Opens in a new window]
Jason Low
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Jason.Low@vuw.ac.nz https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jason-Low-4
Stephen A. Butterfill
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK s.butterfill@warwick.ac.uk https://www.butterfill.com/
John Michael
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Milan, Milano, Italy john.michael@unimi.it https://www.unimi.it/en/ugov/person/john-michael
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Abstract

De Neys's incisive critique of empirical and theoretical research on the exclusivity feature underscores the depth of the challenge of explaining the interplay of fast and slow processes. We argue that a closer look at research on mindreading reveals abundant evidence for the exclusivity feature – as well as methodological and theoretical perspectives that could inform research on fast and slow thinking.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e130
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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