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Explaining normative–deliberative gaps is essential to dual-process theorizing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Edward J. N. Stupple Open the ORCID record for Edward J. N. Stupple [Opens in a new window]  and
Linden J. Ball Open the ORCID record for Linden J. Ball [Opens in a new window]
Edward J. N. Stupple
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, College of Health, Psychology and Social Care, University of Derby, Derby, UK e.j.n.stupple@derby.ac.uk; https://www.derby.ac.uk/staff/ed-stupple/
Linden J. Ball
Affiliation:
School of Psychology & Computer Science, University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK lball@uclan.ac.uk; https://www.uclan.ac.uk/academics/professor-linden-ball
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Abstract

We discuss significant challenges to assumptions of exclusivity and highlight methodological and conceptual pitfalls in inferring deliberative processes from reasoning responses. Causes of normative–deliberative gaps are considered (e.g., disputed or misunderstood normative standards, strategy preferences, task interpretations, cognitive ability, mindware and thinking dispositions) and a soft normativist approach is recommended for developing the dual-process 2.0 architecture.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e143
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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