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Hoist by its own petard: The ironic and fatal flaws of dual-process theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

David E. Melnikoff Open the ORCID record for David E. Melnikoff [Opens in a new window]  and
John A. Bargh Open the ORCID record for John A. Bargh [Opens in a new window]
David E. Melnikoff
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA davidemelnikoff@gmail.com; https://www.davidmelnikoff.com/
John A. Bargh
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA john.bargh@yale.edu; https://acmelab.yale.edu/
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Abstract

By stipulating the existence of a system 1 and a system 2, dual-process theories raise questions about how these systems function. De Neys identifies several such questions for which no plausible answers have ever been offered. What makes the nature of systems 1 and 2 so difficult to ascertain? The answer is simple: The systems do not exist.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e132
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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