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Deliberation is (probably) triggered and sustained by multiple mechanisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Gordon Pennycook Open the ORCID record for Gordon Pennycook [Opens in a new window]
Gordon Pennycook*
Affiliation:
Hill/Levene Schools of Business, University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada Department of Psychology, University of Regina, Regina, SK, Canada grpennycook@gmail.com gordonpennycook.com
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Abstract

De Neys proposes that deliberation is triggered and sustained by uncertainty. I argue that there are cases where deliberation occurs with low uncertainty – such as when problems are excessively complicated and the reasoner decides against engaging in deliberation – and that there are likely multiple factors that lead to (or undermine) deliberation. Nonetheless, De Neys is correct to surface these issues.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e137
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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