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We know what stops you from thinking forever: A metacognitive perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Rakefet Ackerman  and
Kinga Morsanyi Open the ORCID record for Kinga Morsanyi [Opens in a new window]
Rakefet Ackerman
Affiliation:
Faculty of Data and Decision Sciences, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel ackerman@technion.ac.il; technion.ac.il
Kinga Morsanyi
Affiliation:
Centre for Mathematical Cognition, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK k.e.morsanyi@lboro.ac.uk; lboro.ac.uk
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Abstract

This commentary addresses omissions in De Neys's model of fast-and-slow thinking from a metacognitive perspective. We review well-established meta-reasoning monitoring (e.g., confidence) and control processes (e.g., rethinking) that explain mental effort regulation. Moreover, we point to individual, developmental, and task design considerations that affect this regulation. These core issues are completely ignored or mentioned in passing in the target article.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e112
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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