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When a thinker does not want to think: Adding meta-control into the working model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Miroslav Sirota Open the ORCID record for Miroslav Sirota [Opens in a new window]
Miroslav Sirota*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester, UK msirota@essex.ac.uk
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Abstract

De Neys proposes an elegant solution to several theoretical problems of the dual-process theories but underspecifies the role of motivation in initiating, intensifying, and ceasing deliberation. Therefore, I suggest including a meta-cognitive control component in the working model that can moderate deliberation, for instance by affecting the deliberation threshold.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e141
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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