In this study, we investigate who would vote ‘none of the above’ (NOTA) if this were available on the ballot paper using original data from eight European countries. In particular, we examine whether NOTA would be used by abstainers and voters to protest within the electoral process. We also test whether socioeconomic factors and specific and diffuse support for democracy and its institutions correlate with a NOTA vote. We find that having NOTA on the ballot would reduce invalid balloting more than abstention and much more than protest party voting. Our results also suggest that NOTA is related to socioeconomic status, political interest, political knowledge and distrust in political institutions and authorities, but not to broadly undemocratic attitudes. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the increasingly large amounts of abstention and invalid voting, as well as the growing distrust of political institutions, in democratic countries. They also hold lessons for electoral reformers.

When democracies ban political parties, one of the central issues that usually emerges in both public and academic debate concerns the effects of proscription. Some argue that proscription may lead to radicalisation, a growth of militancy and readiness to use violence. Others argue that, in the long run, banning parties may damage the foundations of a democratic polity as the ban may be interpreted as a silent weakening of democratic rights in the state and therefore a failure of democracy itself. However, and notwithstanding its centrality for the conduct of democratic politics, the impact of party bans on party system development has remained mostly under‐researched. Trying to address this lacuna, and employing a new dataset of banned parties in Europe between 1945 and 2015, the study reported in this article compares the effects of party ban regulation on party system stability in three different arenas: electoral, parliamentary and governmental. In particular, the impact of party proscription on electoral volatility, fragmentation and closure is examined in three countries: Turkey, Germany and Spain. Using examples both at national and regional (e.g., Basque Country, Navarre, Saxony) levels, and making use of survey data when available, it is found that the banning of a relevant political party not only increases volatility and reduces fragmentation, but also alters the existing structure of competition at the time of government formation. Likewise, the empirical analysis also suggests a number of alternative hypotheses (i.e., organisational succession, electoral system) when trying to explain why the outcomes of some cases within each country deviate from theoretical expectations. Finally, the article also examines the phenomenon of ‘non‐banning’ and how the failure of attempts to ban political parties might affect the development of a party system.

We combine the recent literature on issue competition with work on intra‐party heterogeneity to advance a novel theoretical argument. Starting from the premise that party leaders and non‐leaders have different motivations and incentives, we conjecture that issue strategies should vary across the party hierarchy. We, therefore, expect systematic intra‐party differences in the use of riding the wave and issue ownership strategies. We test this claim by linking public opinion data to manually coded information on over 3600 press releases issued by over 500 party actors across five election campaigns in Austria between 2006 and 2019. We account for self‐selection into leadership roles by exploiting transitions into and out of leadership status over time. The results show that party leaders are more likely than non‐leaders to respond to the public's issue priorities, but not more or less likely to pursue issue‐ownership strategies.

Public opinion polls have become vital and increasingly visible parts of election campaigns. Previous research has frequently demonstrated that polls can influence both citizens' voting intentions and political parties' campaign strategies. However, they are also fraught with uncertainty. Margins of error can reflect (parts of) this uncertainty. This paper investigates how citizens' voting intentions change due to whether polling estimates are presented with or without margins of error.

Using a vignette experiment (N=3224), we examine this question based on a real‐world example in which different election polls were shown to nationally representative respondents ahead of the 2021 federal election in Germany. We manipulated the display of the margins of error, the interpretation of polls and the closeness of the electoral race.

The results indicate that margins of error can influence citizens' voting intentions. This effect is dependent on the actual closeness of the race and additional interpretative guidance provided to voters. More concretely, the results consistently show that margins of error increase citizens' inclination to vote for one of the two largest contesting parties if the polling gap between these parties is small, and an interpretation underlines this closeness.

The findings of this study are important for three reasons. First, they help to determine whether margins of error can assist citizens in making more informed (strategic) vote decisions. They shed light on whether depicting opinion‐poll uncertainty affects the key features of representative democracy, such as democratic accountability. Second, the results stress the responsibility of the media. The way polls are interpreted and contextualized influences the effect of margins of error on voting behaviour. Third, the findings of this paper underscore the significance of including methodological details when communicating scientific research findings to the broader public.

Theorists have responded to the challenge of pluralism in East Asia by either advocating a less-demanding form of Confucianism or neutral liberal democratic institutions. This article transcends this dichotomy by extending the challenge down to the individual, prioritizing “exit-based” institutional mechanisms characterized by polycentric interjurisdictional competition over collective “voice.” Drawing from the tradition of epistemic liberalism, this framework not only provides groups the space to enact their moral commitments but facilitates cultural discovery in a complex environment where knowledge of what is of cultural importance is in the first place not centralizable. Our novel proposal accepts the pluralist’s preference for an anti-perfectionist regime without being committed to political democracy. In our approach, not only is Confucianism knocked off its special status in justifying the social order, even democracy is deprived of its special status in the arena of governance.

A large and growing body of research draws attention to the rising salience of socio‐cultural and identitarian issues and, potentially, the emergence of a new political cleavage that divides voters on those issues. However, the micro‐foundations of this transformation are less well understood. Here we take a voter‐perspective to evaluate how party competition has been restructured in the eyes of the voter. We leverage measures of citizens’ self‐reported probabilities to vote for alternative political parties in the European Election Study voter surveys between 1999 and 2019 in order to map electoral affinity and opposition among party families. We estimate to what extent spatial location on the economic left–right dimension and the GAL‐TAN dimension explain the patterns that emerge, and how this has changed over time. Our results provide evidence of a substantial shift in voter assessment from party competition structured along the economic left–right dimension to competition structured along the GAL‐TAN dimension. We also find great separation of TAN parties from other parties, with the deepest antipathy between the TAN parties and greens.

Ever since the Great Recession, public debt has become politicised. Some research suggests that citizens are fiscally conservative, while other research shows that they punish governments for implementing fiscal consolidation. This begs the question of whether and how much citizens care about debt. We argue that debt is not a priority for citizens because reducing it involves spending and tax trade-offs. Using a split-sample experiment and a conjoint experiment in four European countries, we show that fiscal consolidation at the cost of spending cuts or taxes hikes is less popular than commonly assumed. Revenue-based consolidation is especially unpopular, but expenditure-based consolidation is also contested. Moreover, the public has clear fiscal policy priorities: People do not favour lower debt and taxes, but they support higher progressive taxes to pay for more government spending. The article furthers our understanding of public opinion on fiscal policies and the likely political consequences of austerity.

While research on the economic characteristics of growth models across countries is now extensive, research on their politics is in its infancy, even though governments routinely pursue different strategies to generate growth. In particular, we lack evidence on (1) whether citizens have coherent preferences towards growth strategies, (2) what growth strategies citizens prefer and (3) what shapes their preferences. We address these questions through a new survey of public opinion in Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which exemplify different economic models. We find that preferences for growth strategies are consistent with other policy preferences and are meaningfully structured by class, retirement status, and to a lesser extent, sector of employment. At the same time, differences across class and sector are small, and a large majority of respondents across countries favour wage‐led growth. This hints at a possible ‘representation gap’ since this growth strategy is in crisis everywhere.

In his seminal work on partitions and divisor functions, MacMahon introduced the following two q-series:

\begin{align*}A_k(q):= \sum_{0 \lt s_1 \lt s_2 \lt \cdots \lt s_k} \frac{q^{s_1+s_2+\cdots+s_k}}{(1-q^{s_1})^2(1-q^{s_2})^2\cdots(1-q^{s_k})^2},\qquad\quad\quad\quad\\[6pt]C_k(q):= \sum_{0 \lt s_1 \lt s_2 \lt \cdots \lt s_k}\frac{q^{2(s_1+s_2+\cdots+s_k)-k}}{(1-q^{2s_1-1})^2(1-q^{2s_2-1})^2\cdots(1-q^{2s_k-1})^2}.\end{align*}

In 2013, Andrews and Rose proved that $A_k(q)$ and $C_k(q)$ are quasimodular forms of weight $\leq 2k$. Recently, Ono and Singh proved two interesting identities involving $A_k(q)$ and $C_k(q)$ and showed that the generating functions for the three-coloured partition function $p_3(n)$ and the overpartition function $\overline{p}(n)$ have infinitely many closed formulas in terms of MacMahon’s quasimodular forms $A_k(q)$ and $C_k(q)$. In this paper, we introduce the finite forms $A_{k,n}(q)$ and $C_{k,n}(q)$ of MacMahon’s q-series $A_k(q)$ and $C_k(q)$ and prove two identities which generalize Ono–Singh’s identities. We also prove some new identities involving $A_{k,n}(q)$, $C_{k,n}(q)$ and certain infinite products based on two Bailey pairs. Those identities are analogous to Ono–Singh’s identities.

What are the psychological roots of support for populist parties or outfits such as the Tea Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom or Germany's Left Party? Populist parties have as a common denominator that they employ an anti‐establishment message, which they combine with some ‘host’ ideology. Building on the congruency model of political preference, it is to be expected that a voter's personality should match with the message and position of his or her party. This article theorises that a low score on the personality trait Agreeableness matches the anti‐establishment message and should predict voting for populist parties. Evidence is found for this hypothesis in the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. The relationship between low Agreeableness and voting for populist parties is robust, controlling for other personality traits, authoritarianism, sociodemographic characteristics and ideology. Thus, explanations of the success of populism should take personality traits into account.

This article examines support for radical left ideologies in 32 European countries. It thus extends the relatively scant empirical research available in this field. The hypotheses tested are derived mainly from group‐interest theory. Data are deployed from the 2002–2010 European Social Surveys (N = 174,868), supplemented by characteristics at the country level. The results show that, also in the new millennium, unemployed people and those with a lower income are more likely to support a radical left ideology. This is only partly explained by their stronger opinion that governments should take measures to reduce income differences. In contrast to expectations, the findings show that greater income inequality within a country is associated with reduced likelihood of an individual supporting a radical left ideology. Furthermore, cross‐national differences in the likelihood of supporting the radical left are strongly associated with whether a country has a legacy of an authoritarian regime.

This article analyses the margin of manoeuvre of Portuguese executives after the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010–2015. To obtain a full understanding of what happened behind the closed doors of international meetings, different types of data are triangulated: face‐to‐face interviews; investigations by journalists; and International Monetary Fund and European Union official documents. The findings are compared to the public discourse of Prime Ministers José Sócrates and Pedro Passos‐Coelho. It is shown that while the sovereign debt crisis and the bail‐out limited the executive's autonomy, they also made them stronger in relation to other domestic actors. The perceived need for ‘credibility’ in order to avoid a ‘negative’ reaction from the markets – later associated with the conditions of the bail‐out – concurrently gave the executives a legitimate justification to concentrate power in their hands and a strong argument to counter the opponents of their proposed reforms. Consequently, when Portuguese ministers favoured policies that were in congruence with those supported by international actors, they were able to use the crisis to advance their own agenda. Disagreement with Troika representatives implied the start of a negotiation process between the ministers and international lenders, the final outcome of which depended on the actors’ bargaining powers. These strategies, it is argued, constitute a tactic of depoliticisation in which both the material constraints and the discourse used to frame them are employed to construct imperatives around a narrow selection of policy alternatives.

In the last decade, the idea of total defence – a whole-of-society approach integrating civilian and military capabilities – has gained renewed prominence in Europe, including within the European Union (EU). Concurrently, the concept of strategic autonomy – the EU’s ability to act independently – has emerged as a central feature in its security policy, driving ambitions for ‘a quantum leap forward on security and defence’.1 Despite significant conceptual overlaps, the relationship between total defence and strategic autonomy remains underexplored. Drawing on discursive institutionalism and the ideational power framework, this article examines EU security discourses from 2010 to 2024, analysing how strategic autonomy has shaped the development of European total defence. The study considers three dimensions of ideational power – through, over, and in – showing that while the idea of total defence predates strategic autonomy, the latter has certainly elevated the idea of European total defence and enhanced collective capability building, especially through entwining civilian and military domains, and yet has constrained the establishment of a unified military defence. The findings underscore the long-term discursive evolution underpinning the EU’s security strategy and its ongoing efforts to consolidate a European total defence framework, now more tangible than ever.

Building on previous work on competition networks and governmental performance among British local governments, this article investigates the diffusion of government quality across subnational regions of Europe through strategic interaction with neighbouring regions or competitor regions more generally. The article demonstrates the presence of spatial interdependence using standard spatial regression models and controlling for common explanations of quality of government. In particular for regions with high levels of autonomy from the national government, there is clear adjustment in government quality to be seen in response to disparities with competitor regions. The article further investigates the intensity of this geographical effect separately in the north and south of Europe in order to estimate the potential for virtuous or vicious cycles of good governance in the two regions, respectively. It is found that while regions in the north develop relatively independently of each other but respond to competitive pressure across Europe, in the south regions demonstrate a higher level of local interdependence, increasing the possibility of virtuous cycles – but also of vicious ones.