The CEO of the Chartered Institute of Library and Information Professionals (CILIP), Louis Coiffait-Gunn, talks to LIM about his mission to lead CILIP and the profession it supports through the many changes it’s now facing, why it shouldn’t matter that he is not, and has never been, a librarian, and how he believes AI is likely to affect the library world.

This epilogue considers the approach and conception of this collection, highlighting key analytical strands in the essays while also suggesting possible avenues of further research. It spotlights the global nature of their analysis, which offers one structural framework – individual scientific personas and the often transnational networks which they inhabit – as a possible avenue to imagine a so-called global Space Age. The epilogue also investigates possible frames for further analyses, particularly regarding gender and translation. Men dominate the pantheon of space personas, which, I argue, is a function of the way popular discourses about space travel are still dominated not only by patriarchal and often misogynistic tropes, but also by how we define ‘technology’ itself as essentially a male domain of activity. More broadly, we need further investigation of multiple and gendered erasures involved in the creation of male space personas. Similarly, the kinds of tools, work and strategies the space personas deployed to translate their visions across different social, discursive, cultural and temporal domains require attention. In particular, one can imagine that the afterlife of these personas will be susceptible to change and alteration as their messages, reputations, and principal attachments are continually reshaped by historical change, popular culture, and academic currents.

We show the existence of large $\mathcal C^1$ open sets of area-preserving endomorphisms of the two-torus which have no dominated splitting and are non-uniformly hyperbolic, meaning that Lebesgue almost every point has a positive and a negative Lyapunov exponent. The integrated Lyapunov exponents vary continuously with the dynamics in the $\mathcal C^1$ topology and can be taken as far away from zero as desired. Explicit real analytic examples are obtained by deforming linear endomorphisms, including expanding ones. The technique works in nearly every homotopy class, and the examples are stably ergodic (in fact Bernoulli), provided that the linear map has no eigenvalue of modulus one.

Arnaldo Tamayo Méndez, the first Cuban, Latin American, and person of African descent to travel to space, has experienced a significant evolution in his persona since his historic flight aboard Soyuz 38 in 1980. This article explores three pivotal phases in this transformation: first, his portrayal in the media as a pioneering Cuban cosmonaut, which positioned him among the socialist elite of the Space Age; second, the controversy regarding the identity of the first Black person in space, which brought renewed attention to Tamayo’s achievements; and third, the ongoing reconfiguration of his image through social-media platforms, allowing for broader engagement with diverse audiences. By applying the principles of persona analysis to a multilinguistic set of historical documents and images related to Tamayo, this study illustrates the malleability of his self-fashioning for different audiences and how it has adapted to reflect changing sociopolitical contexts and the evolving landscape of public representation in the digital age.

Arithmetic and logic seem to enjoy an especially close relationship. Frege once wrote that arithmetic is reason’s nearest kin. To deny any of the basic laws of arithmetic seems tantamount to denying a basic law of logic. My dissertation is concerned with two great attempts to make something more of this informal idea. In one direction, Frege tried to reduce arithmetic to nothing but quantificational logic and definitions. Neologicists continue to follow in Frege’s footsteps, pursuing a version of this program today. In the other direction, Gödel tried to reduce certain applications of quantificational logic to nothing but arithmetic and definitions, by means of his Dialectica translation.

In the first half of my dissertation, I prove new theorems (with Jeremy Avigad) that shed a surprising light on the prospects for neologicism. An important objection against neologicism is that it makes use of allegedly stipulative definitions that are not conservative over pure logic, i.e., definitions that yield new consequences expressible in old vocabulary. This violates a basic requirement on stipulative definitions. I argue that by passing to a richer logical and definitional framework, it is possible to overcome the conservativeness objection. However, there is a subtlety: the strategy succeeds only if conservativeness is understood semantically rather than deductively. This suggests that the viability of neologicism is highly sensitive to the way in which epistemic commitments are represented in formal theories.

In the second half of my dissertation, I argue that Gödel’s Dialectica translation succeeds in assigning a constructive meaning to quantificational theories of arithmetic. Virtually all commentators have objected that Gödel’s translation makes use of definitions which presuppose the very quantificational logic that Gödel was trying to eliminate. This would render the translation philosophically circular. Gödel was adamant that there was no circularity here. He attempted to explain the matter in a page-long footnote, which, however, no one has been able to understand. I vindicate Gödel, showing that there is no circularity and answering a longstanding exegetical question in Gödel scholarship.

Abstract prepared by Stephen Mackereth

E-mail: sgmackereth@gmail.com

URL: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/46578

The reason model of precedential constraint is supposed to generate a stricter doctrine than the minimalist result model. In the standard setting in which these models were originally formalized, that is exactly what we find. Surprisingly, however, in the more complex dimensional setting, the models become indistinguishable. In this paper, we provide an illuminating explanation of the collapse. We also shed light on recent proposals to modify the reason model, or the underlying dimensional setting, in order to avoid it. Finally, we show how the models can be made to collapse even in the simpler standard setting.

It is sometimes morally permissible not to help others even when doing so is overall better for you. For example, you are not morally required to take a career in medicine over a career in music, even if the former is both better for others and better for you. I argue that the permissibility of not helping in a range of cases of “compensated altruism” is explained by the existence of autonomy-based considerations. I sketch a view according to which you can have autonomy-based permissions to choose between alternatives when these alternatives differ in terms of the valuable features they instantiate. Along the way, I argue that considerations of moral autonomy do not support rejecting the plausible view that we each constantly face reasons with morally requiring strength to help (distant) strangers.