Arnaldo Tamayo Méndez, the first Cuban, Latin American, and person of African descent to travel to space, has experienced a significant evolution in his persona since his historic flight aboard Soyuz 38 in 1980. This article explores three pivotal phases in this transformation: first, his portrayal in the media as a pioneering Cuban cosmonaut, which positioned him among the socialist elite of the Space Age; second, the controversy regarding the identity of the first Black person in space, which brought renewed attention to Tamayo’s achievements; and third, the ongoing reconfiguration of his image through social-media platforms, allowing for broader engagement with diverse audiences. By applying the principles of persona analysis to a multilinguistic set of historical documents and images related to Tamayo, this study illustrates the malleability of his self-fashioning for different audiences and how it has adapted to reflect changing sociopolitical contexts and the evolving landscape of public representation in the digital age.

Arithmetic and logic seem to enjoy an especially close relationship. Frege once wrote that arithmetic is reason’s nearest kin. To deny any of the basic laws of arithmetic seems tantamount to denying a basic law of logic. My dissertation is concerned with two great attempts to make something more of this informal idea. In one direction, Frege tried to reduce arithmetic to nothing but quantificational logic and definitions. Neologicists continue to follow in Frege’s footsteps, pursuing a version of this program today. In the other direction, Gödel tried to reduce certain applications of quantificational logic to nothing but arithmetic and definitions, by means of his Dialectica translation.

In the first half of my dissertation, I prove new theorems (with Jeremy Avigad) that shed a surprising light on the prospects for neologicism. An important objection against neologicism is that it makes use of allegedly stipulative definitions that are not conservative over pure logic, i.e., definitions that yield new consequences expressible in old vocabulary. This violates a basic requirement on stipulative definitions. I argue that by passing to a richer logical and definitional framework, it is possible to overcome the conservativeness objection. However, there is a subtlety: the strategy succeeds only if conservativeness is understood semantically rather than deductively. This suggests that the viability of neologicism is highly sensitive to the way in which epistemic commitments are represented in formal theories.

In the second half of my dissertation, I argue that Gödel’s Dialectica translation succeeds in assigning a constructive meaning to quantificational theories of arithmetic. Virtually all commentators have objected that Gödel’s translation makes use of definitions which presuppose the very quantificational logic that Gödel was trying to eliminate. This would render the translation philosophically circular. Gödel was adamant that there was no circularity here. He attempted to explain the matter in a page-long footnote, which, however, no one has been able to understand. I vindicate Gödel, showing that there is no circularity and answering a longstanding exegetical question in Gödel scholarship.

Abstract prepared by Stephen Mackereth

E-mail: sgmackereth@gmail.com

URL: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/46578

The reason model of precedential constraint is supposed to generate a stricter doctrine than the minimalist result model. In the standard setting in which these models were originally formalized, that is exactly what we find. Surprisingly, however, in the more complex dimensional setting, the models become indistinguishable. In this paper, we provide an illuminating explanation of the collapse. We also shed light on recent proposals to modify the reason model, or the underlying dimensional setting, in order to avoid it. Finally, we show how the models can be made to collapse even in the simpler standard setting.

It is sometimes morally permissible not to help others even when doing so is overall better for you. For example, you are not morally required to take a career in medicine over a career in music, even if the former is both better for others and better for you. I argue that the permissibility of not helping in a range of cases of “compensated altruism” is explained by the existence of autonomy-based considerations. I sketch a view according to which you can have autonomy-based permissions to choose between alternatives when these alternatives differ in terms of the valuable features they instantiate. Along the way, I argue that considerations of moral autonomy do not support rejecting the plausible view that we each constantly face reasons with morally requiring strength to help (distant) strangers.

This article traces the history of the life sciences business in the Cambridge–Boston area and explores how it became the global epicenter of the modern therapeutics industry. While business history scholarship on therapeutics is extensive, few have studied recent technological modalities—from therapeutic proteins to cell and gene therapies—or adopted a regional ecosystem perspective. Based on archival materials and oral histories, this research bridges these works and incorporates insights from the innovation ecosystems framework. It considers how dynamic interactions between an evolving network of complementary and interdependent actors, including therapeutics firms, universities, hospitals, and risk capital providers, enhanced innovative capacity. This perspective also illuminates how ecosystem strength derived from the co-evolution of actors—from universities restructuring technology transfer offices to academic scientists becoming entrepreneurs. The research further highlights the nonlinearity of innovation processes. It shows how an extraordinary interplay between structural advantage, serendipitous timing, and strategic actions cultivated an unparalleled capacity to translate emergent technologies into novel therapies.

We perform a general study of the structure of locally compact modules over compactly generated abelian groups. We obtain a dévissage result for such modules of the form ‘compact-by-sheer-by-discrete’, and then study more specifically the sheer part. The main typical example of a sheer module is a polycontractible module, that is, a finite direct product of modules, each of which is contracted by some group element. We show that every sheer module has a ‘large’ polycontractible submodule, in some suitable sense. We apply this to the study of compactly generated metabelian groups. For instance, we prove that they always have a maximal compact normal subgroup, and we extend the Bieri–Strebel characterization of compactly presentable metabelian groups from the discrete case to this more general setting.

Victor Pelevin’s novel Generation P has attracted both popular and academic interest for its ability to capture the zeitgeist of Russia in the 1990s and a generation searching for a new identity in the ruins of the Soviet Union. However, one element has been largely ignored by scholars: the role of fungi and, specifically, the entheogenic mukhomor. Here we discuss the history of mukhomor in the Russian context and demonstrate how Pelevin’s representations of mukhomor advance the novel’s critique regarding the reinvention of Russia’s identity after the fall of the Soviet Union. We argue that via its mukhomor-induced hallucinations, the novel ironizes the imperial narratives which sought to restore a mythical but allegedly authentic Russian past. The novel plays with the idea that if there is a future that can qualify as authentically Russian, then it should be one where the very notion of Russianness is abandoned. What renders this future authentically Russian is the genetic origin of mukhomor in the Russian hinterland, the very element which enables a vision of the world as such, devoid of symbolic order and of all identities.

In their article, Drabiak et al. review the state laws and ethical debates related to the determination of death by neurologic criteria, analyze the recent 2023 American Academy of Neurology practice guidelines, and make policy recommendations. We call this review ‘just’ because the article correctly focuses on the chief ethical, legal, and medical issue in this debate — namely whether patients declared dead by neurological criteria are actually dead, along with the need to improve integrity, honesty, trust, and residency education and training to reduce moral distress and achieve moral certainty in declaring patients dead, initiating organ procurement, and communicating these realities to patient families/surrogates. As the authors invite the reader to comprehend, it should no longer be considered a minority or fringe opinion that determinations of brain death are rife with false positives, inadvertent misdiagnoses, violations of informed consent, and, ultimately, dissent from the law. For the sake of justice, one would do well to heed these words.