Many theories of political participation imply that close elections increase voter turnout, but empirical support for this is mixed. One challenge is that close elections occur in unrepresentative places, making it difficult to extend counterfactual inferences across the wider electorate. In this note, I study closeness in an alternative way by leveraging those who move home between elections. With a large‐scale longitudinal survey in Great Britain, comparing individuals who move between safe and competitive parliamentary constituencies, I provide evidence that closeness increases campaign contact but generally fails to affect turnout. British movers are politically comparable to the wider electorate, so the results can be cautiously generalised. This contributes to substantive literature on voter and party‐led theories of participation, while adopting an empirical strategy seldom used in the study of political behaviour.

What preferences do people have for cross‐country cooperation on irregular migration and refugee protection? Existing research improves our understanding of how voters react to large‐scale inflows of asylum seekers, like those experienced by European countries in 2015–2016, and the type of asylum seekers and policies preferred by European citizens. We know less, however, about people's views concerning a particular European Union (EU) response to the so‐called ‘refugee crisis’, namely the cooperation with Turkey in March 2016 to stem inflows of asylum seekers and other migrants. To study such views, we build on several strands of the international relations literature exploring key determinants of public preferences for international cooperation on cross‐national issues, namely (a) sociotropic concerns, (b) humanitarian considerations, and (c) perceptions of fairness and reciprocity. Our research design leverages conjoint experiments conducted simultaneously in Germany, Greece and Turkey. We find that the three factors indeed play a role in explaining preferences in the three countries. Moreover, while respondents are favourable to several core features of the current EU–Turkey migration deal (regarding the return of irregular migrants, financial aid to refugees, and border controls), we also find evidence of public support for increased cooperation on resettlement and EU support to Greece to deal with migration, which goes beyond the status quo. In certain aspects of cooperation, public preferences seem to respond to interactions between policy dimensions that capture reciprocity. These findings have important implications for research on public preferences for asylum and migration policies and public support for international cooperation more generally.

That parties fulfil their pre‐election pledges once they are in government is a fundamental idea of many democracy models. This paper addresses the question of whether the government/opposition status of their party affects how much citizens want governments to fulfil their promises. We hypothesize that interest‐driven, rational voters are more likely to prefer their own party to keep its promises and investigate whether this rationale is impacted by public opinion and expert views. The analysis is based on a survey experiment conducted in Australia and Austria. It finds that voters broadly adhere to the democratic principle of expecting pledge fulfilment but, at the same time, some take a rational approach to government promises. The opinions of the public and experts mitigate but do not change this effect. Another key finding is the significant difference in the preference for promise keeping versus promise breaking between government and opposition voters in the Austrian case, the country with the more heterogeneous and polarized political system. This paper contributes to the literature on voters’ attitudes on democracy and pledge fulfilment by showing that voters are normatively driven but a significant number of voters deviate and instead follow the rational voter logic.

The increased salience of environmental concerns, first and foremost global warming, is one of the key developments of contemporary Western European politics. Still, the effects of global warming issues on electoral outcomes, party competition and polarization remain poorly understood. Our article shows how the construction of wind turbines fuels conflict between its key proponents and opponents, Green and populist radical right parties. Contention over the issue contributes to the electoral success of both sides and therefore reinforces the new central divide between them. Drawing on a novel dataset, we investigate the impact of the construction of wind turbines on Alternative für Deutschland and Green party electoral success in Germany. We employ a two‐way fixed effects model, where the construction of wind turbines functions as the independent variable. We show that the construction of wind turbines boosts the electoral support of both their biggest supporters and their biggest opponents. Our results have important implications for understanding contemporary political conflict in Western Europe such as the electoral rise of the Greens and the populist radical right, the importance of issue salience and the polarization of party systems.

This article analyses the role of political parties in policy accumulation. We study this relationship in the area of social policy. Our analysis builds on a large data set covering the size of policy portfolios (policy targets and instruments) in three subfields of social policy for 22 OECD countries over 30 years. We find that the probability of social policy accumulation is not affected by the government's ideological position. Left governments do not produce more extensive social policy portfolios than right ones. Yet, this striking result does not contradict governments’ political ideologies, as left and right parties accumulate for different reasons. While left parties address new social policy targets to broaden the scope of the welfare state, right parties adopt new policy instruments to condition social benefits. These findings hold regardless of how we measure governments’ ideological position and despite strong endogenous policy growth dynamics, that is, countries with greater policy portfolios also display higher levels of policy accumulation. Our findings indicate that party political considerations can explain the reasons for but not the level of policy accumulation. Changes in government are thus unlikely to stall or slow down the constant accumulation of public policies.

Immigration is a hot topic in Europe, but research on the media effects on public attention to immigration remains limited. We examine how media coverage affects the degree of importance attached to immigration in seven Western European Union member states. Data come from an extensive analysis of claims in printed newspapers, and the Eurobarometer (2002–2009). The continuous sample of news coverage is aggregated into a biannual panel, and we relate these data to citizens’ perceptions of the most important issues in their country 6 months later (lagged). The public consider immigration more important than other policy‐related issues when there is an increase in the volume of news and more political claims on the topic in the media. The media environment appears to be an exogenous actor that can have agenda‐setting effects on public concern about immigration. Our results highlight limitations of both the ‘policy‐gap’ thesis and thermostatic models of policy making.

This paper explores a major road to substantive representation in democracies, by clarifying whether demands of rich and poor citizens are taken up in the electoral platforms of political parties. Doing so constitutes a substantial broadening and deepening of our understanding of substantive representation – broadening the countries, issue‐areas and years that form the empirical basis for judging whether democracies manifest unequal representation; and deepening the process of representation by clarifying a key pathway connecting societal demands to policy outcomes. The paper hypothesises that party systems in general will respond more strongly to wealthy than to poor segments of a polity. It also hypothesises that left parties will more faithfully represent poorer and less significantly represent richer citizens than do right parties. We find substantial support for these expectations in a new dataset that combines multi‐country, multi‐issue‐area, multi‐wave survey data with data on party platforms for 39 democracies.

With the installation of next-generation phased array feed (PAF) receivers on radio telescopes, there is an urgent need to develop effective and computationally efficient radio frequency interference (RFI) mitigation methods for large-scale surveys. Here, we present a new RFI mitigation package, called mRAID (multi-beam RAdio frequency Interference Detector), which uses the eigenvalue decomposition algorithm to identify RFI in cross-correlation matrix (CCM) of data recorded by multiple beams. When applied to high time-resolution pulsar search data from the Five-hundred-meter Aperture Spherical Radio Telescope (FAST), mRAID demonstrates excellent performance in identifying RFI over short timescales, thereby enhancing the efficiency of pulsar and fast radio burst (FRB) searches. Since the computation of the CCM and the eigenvalue decomposition for each time sub-integration and frequency channel are independent, the process is fully parallelisable. As a result, mRAID offers a significant computational advantage over commonly used RFI detection methods.

To what extent do ministries dominate a particular policy domain? The policy dictator model and many principle‐agent models of governmental control that followed suit assume that governments create ministries with clear and exclusive policy responsibilities. We test this assertion using data from parliamentary bills from Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. For each bill, we observe its substantial policy content and the responsible ministry. The data show that bills on similar issues regularly are drafted by different ministries in parliamentary democracies. About 40 per cent of policy issues cannot be ascribed to one dominant ministry. The regularities elucidate that ministerial division of labour within governments is considerably more complex than commonly assumed. The variegated level of ministerial dominance across policy domains calls for a new research agenda on how governments assign responsibility for legislative action in parliamentary democracies.

Political parties in office generally incur a cost of ruling among the electorate. This article considers the broader implications of this phenomenon for democratic governance. We argue that the electoral cost a party incurs in office entails that its individual legislators become more inclined to vote against the party line as a way to distance themselves from the deteriorating party brand. We test and support several observable implications of this argument using time series data including all members of parliament in the British parliament between 1992 and 2015 coupled with monthly opinion poll data. The well‐established electoral cost of ruling thus translates into a legislative cost of ruling by reducing incumbent party legislators’ loyalty to the party line. We discuss how the legislative cost of ruling complicates effective governance but may also strengthen democratic accountability by reducing legislative capacity of governing parties that have lost their electoral mandate.

Eating duration and shift work can both influence metabolic regulation, but their joint associations with diabetes are unknown. We aimed to examine the independent and joint associations of eating duration and shift work with diabetes in a cross-sectional study using a nationally representative sample of US workers. We included 14852 eligible participants from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 2005–2010 and 2017–2020. Eating duration was calculated based on first and last eating occasions from 24-h dietary recalls. Long eating duration (LED: ≥ 13 h) v. short eating duration (SED: < 13 h) was defined based on the median. Workers were classified as engaging in shift work (SW, n 5140) v. non-shift work (NSW, n 8945) based on self-report. Logistic regressions were used to examine the associations of LED and SW with diabetes, independently and jointly with stratification by age. LED was associated with higher odds of diabetes among workers aged < 45 years (OR, 1·51; 95 % CI, 1·05–2·19) but not among workers aged ≥ 45 years (OR, 0·98; 95 % CI, 0·79–1·20). SW was associated with higher odds of diabetes among both younger (OR, 1·28; 95 % CI, 0·88–1·85) and older workers (OR, 1·28; 95 % CI, 1·04–1·58). There was suggestive evidence that workers with both LED and SW had higher odds of diabetes compared with those with SED and NSW, but the association was stronger among younger (OR, 1·40; 95 % CI, 0·85–2·28) than older workers (OR, 1·28; 95 % CI, 0·99–1·66). LED and SW were independently associated with increased odds of diabetes with suggestive evidence on their joint associations, but associations varied by workers’ age.

Switches produce a lack of credibility and damage a party's image, signalling weakness and an inability to select loyal MPs and preserve unity. Accordingly, we consider party out‐switching as a valence loss for the party. By combining information on party manifestos with a novel database on 2053 episodes of party switching, we investigate which electoral strategies parties adopt to reduce the negative consequences of such valence loss. Analyzing 1,131 manifestos related to 135 parties in 14 Western European democracies, from 1945 to 2015, we show that parties try to restore their positive image by investing on valence, in terms of competence, clarity and core issues. An instrumental variable approach corroborates our results. The findings have implications for spatial modelling, valence politics, issue ownership and issue competition.

Populist parties have been increasingly successful in European politics over the last decade. Although research suggests that nostalgic deprivation – a perceived loss of economic, political or social status — is linked to support for populist parties, the generalizability of this argument across voters and national contexts remains unclear. In this research note, we leverage original representative surveys across 19 European countries to demonstrate that perceptions of declining status are a consistent predictor of populist support. Decomposing nostalgic deprivation into different dimensions, we find that while social, economic and power deprivation have different antecedents, each predicts populist attitudes and voting behaviour. Moreover, we find that nostalgic deprivation predicts support for populist platforms among both left‐wing and right‐wing respondents, as well as across Eastern and Western Europe.  While the antecedents differ across contexts, these findings confirm that perceptions of downward mobility are associated with the rise of populism in Europe.

Research on representation consistently shows that high‐income voters see more of their preferred policies implemented than less affluent citizens. However, the mechanisms behind this unequal policy representation remain unclear. This paper examines how voter behaviour, particularly the alignment between vote choices and policy outcomes, contributes to this disparity. Using a large dataset that spans close to 300,000 respondents across 32 European countries and 197 election periods, we analyse public policy preferences, vote choices and policy implementation. We find that high‐income voters have higher levels of policy congruence, are more likely to vote, vote more for parties whose positions match their own and are more likely to see their preferred parties in government. Nevertheless, these factors still do not explain the observed inequality in opinion–policy congruence. Hence, unequal representation cannot be attributed to electoral mechanisms. This result has important implications for our understanding of (unequal) policy representation and electoral accountability.

Rational choice theories of political behaviour start from the premise that parties seek policy, office, and votes. In accordance with this premise, previous research has shown that electoral performance and office achievement independently affect party leader survival. However, we know little about how goal attainment interacts across these two domains. This paper proposes a novel hypothesis stating that intrinsic goals (office) dominate over purely instrumental ones (votes). As a result, the impact of electoral performance on party leader survival should be conditional on office achievement. Using data on over 500 party leaders in 14 parliamentary democracies between 1965 and 2012, we show that electoral performance and office achievement strongly affect leadership turnover. However, we also demonstrate that the electoral performance effect disappears when parties enter or exit office at the same time. These results constitute the best direct evidence to date that parties prioritise office achievement over electoral success.

Parties strive to set the ‘terms of the debate’ in elections by selectively emphasising issue areas that enhance their popular appeal. Yet, do citizens respond to parties’ issue emphasis, or do they mainly respond to objective factors such as economic and environmental conditions, crime rates, immigration flows, and so on? We report a time-series, cross-sectional analyses of the relationship between the public's issue attention, parties’ issue emphases and objective national conditions across seven issue areas in 13 western publics between 1971 and 2021, finding a strong association between objective conditions and citizens’ subsequent issue attention, but weaker associations to party system issue attention. There are stronger links, however, between parties’ issue emphases and their supporters’ subsequent attention.

Semi‐parliamentary government is a distinct executive‐legislative system that mirrors semi‐presidentialism. It exists when the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, only one of which can dismiss the prime minister in a no‐confidence vote. This system has distinct advantages over pure parliamentary and presidential systems: it establishes a branch‐based separation of powers and can balance the ‘majoritarian’ and ‘proportional’ visions of democracy without concentrating executive power in a single individual. This article analyses bicameral versions of semi‐parliamentary government in Australia and Japan, and compares empirical patterns of democracy in the Australian Commonwealth as well as New South Wales to 20 advanced parliamentary and semi‐presidential systems. It discusses new semi‐parliamentary designs, some of which do not require formal bicameralism, and pays special attention to semi‐parliamentary options for democratising the European Union.

Snap elections, those triggered by incumbents in advance of their original date in the electoral calendar, are a common feature of parliamentary democracies. In this paper, I ask: do snap elections influence citizens’ trust in the government? Theoretically, I argue that providing citizens with an additional means of endorsing or rejecting the incumbent – giving voters a chance to ‘have their say’ – can be interpreted by citizens as normatively desirable and demonstrative of the incumbent's desire to legitimise their agenda by (re)-invigorating their political mandate. Leveraging the quasi-experimental setting provided by the coincidental timing of the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May's, shock announcement of early elections in April 2017 with the fieldwork for the Eurobarometer survey, I demonstrate that the announcement of snap elections had a sizeable and significant positive effect on political trust. This trust-inducing effect is at odds with the observed electoral consequences of the 2017 snap elections. Whilst incumbent-triggered elections can facilitate net gains for the sitting government, May's 2017 gamble cost the Conservative Party their majority. Snap elections did increase political trust. These trust-inducing effects were not observed symmetrically for all citizens. Whilst Eurosceptics and voters on the right of the ideological spectrum – those most inclined to support the incumbent May-led Conservative government in 2017 – became more trusting, no such changes in trust were observed amongst left-wing or non-Eurosceptic respondents. This study advances the understanding of a relatively understudied yet not uncommon political phenomenon, providing causal evidence that snap elections have implications for political trust.