This chapter offers a thorough understanding of polarization and its applications. We explore its historical development from static charge theories to modern insights involving Berry phases. Additionally, we examine ferroic materials.

Ocean acidification is a significant but under-recognised climate impact where oceans absorb CO2, leading to a 30–40 per cent decrease in pH since pre-industrial times. This poses a threat to marine ecosystems and food webs, as calcifying organisms such as oysters and corals struggle to build their shells, while non-calcifying species face behavioural changes. Despite an increasing amount of scientific literature, OA receives minimal attention from social sciences and lacks international governance. The book explores how OA should be governed, mapping the governance landscape as a regime complex involving multiple actors and instruments. It proposes global experimentalist governance as suitable for addressing the complexity of OA, examining case studies of the OA Alliance and the International Maritime Organization. The research finds that while OA is framed as a climate change effect needing holistic responses, including mitigation, adaptation, and resilience measures, current governance remains fragmented, with limited coordination among relevant international frameworks.

This chapter analyses the Ocean Acidification Alliance (OAA) against five elements of global experimentalist governance. The OAA, launched in 2016 by Pacific Coast governments, comprises over 145 members addressing ocean acidification. Evaluating the five elements reveals: (1) A shared problem exists – members agree on OA definition and causes; (2) Open-ended goals are present – six framework objectives like ‘reduce CO2 emissions’ with provisional, loosely worded targets; (3) Delegation occurs – members create Action Plans with discretion to experiment, although delegation is not solely to lower levels; (4) Feedback and peer review are limited – information sharing occurs through webinars and meetings but lacks systematic reporting on specific metrics; (5) Goal adjustment is possible – goals and metrics can evolve based on scientific findings and member experiences. A key limitation is that metrics lack specificity, undermining systematic reporting and peer-review cycles essential to experimentalist governance. No penalty default exists due to voluntary membership. While the OAA exhibits features of experimentalist governance, the absence of concrete metrics weakens the recursive learning process. Future metric development could enhance the implementation of experimentalist governance within this voluntary, multilevel climate coalition.

This chapter outlines the governance landscape of ocean acidification (OA), identifying thirty-one actors and twenty-seven instruments at the international, regional, local, and transnational levels. The map indicates that no single institution leads OA governance; rather, multiple institutions address different aspects through implicit mandates rather than explicit ones. Only the Ocean Acidification Alliance has a clear OA mission. Most institutions operate across various fields such as climate, biodiversity, and marine protection, resulting in functional overlaps without a clear hierarchy. Applying regime complex theory, the chapter contends that OA governance constitutes a regime complex – partially overlapping, likely non-hierarchical institutions governing the same issue area. Three factors affirm this classification: divergent interests (economic vs. environmental), high uncertainty (scientific complexity and multiple actors), and limited linkages between institutions. The regime complex is situated at the intersection of climate, marine, and atmospheric governance systems. This characterisation is vital, as it implies that global experimentalist governance could effectively utilise these existing institutional arrangements rather than supplanting them, laying the groundwork for selecting suitable governance approaches in subsequent chapters.

This chapter proposes global experimentalist governance as an ideal framework for addressing ocean acidification (OA). Global experimentalist governance consists of five elements: identifying a shared problem, setting open-ended goals, delegating solutions to lower governance levels, establishing feedback and peer-review mechanisms, and adjusting goals based on learning. This approach aligns well with OA’s characteristics, which are both scientific and part of a regime complex. The framework accommodates OA’s complexity through recursive learning cycles, multilevel participation, and provisional goal setting that can adapt as scientific understanding advances. A central unit coordinates, but does not control, the process, using ‘penalty defaults’ to encourage reluctant actors to cooperate. Favourable background conditions for experimentalist governance exist for OA, such as strategic uncertainty due to problem complexity and polyarchic power distribution with no single dominant actor. The chapter concludes that this governance approach could leverage OA’s existing regime complex rather than replace it, making it a promising framework for tackling this emerging environmental challenge.

This chapter selects two case studies to examine the presence of global experimentalist governance in ocean acidification governance: the Ocean Acidification Alliance and the International Maritime Organization. The selection distinguishes between ‘suitable’ institutions (addressing one OA activity) and those with ‘significant potential’ (addressing multiple activities within one concern or across concerns). Using a comprehensive table that maps actors and instruments, the chapter analyses how institutions address OA’s three concerns: causes (CO2, NOx/SOx), stressors (e.g., climate change, pollution, and fishing), and adaptation (blue carbon, marine protected areas, and fisheries management). Most institutions show significant potential by addressing concerns in depth and/or breadth. The OA Alliance was selected as the only institution explicitly focused on OA, addressing CO2 emissions and coastal activities. The IMO was chosen for its role in shipping emissions (both CO2 and NOx/SOx) and broader pollution control mandate. These cases differ in legalisation levels and institutional structure, providing diverse perspectives on experimentalist governance challenges. Both have significant potential and focus on CO2, the primary OA driver, making them ideal candidates for testing the implementation of global experimentalist governance.

This chapter analyses the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a case study for global experimentalist governance in ocean acidification. Shipping significantly contributes to OA through CO2, NOx, and SOx emissions, along with scrubber discharge that releases acidic water directly into the oceans. The IMO regulates shipping but scarcely acknowledges OA, instead promoting scrubbers despite their harmful effects. The chapter assesses the IMO’s climate change response against experimentalist governance elements: (1) A shared problem exists – stakeholders agree climate change needs addressing; (2) Open-ended goals are present – the Revised GHG Strategy sets framework objectives like ‘reducing emissions as soon as possible’ with specific metrics; (3) Delegation occurs through National Action Plans (NAPs), where member states experiment with solutions; (4) Feedback and peer review are limited – only 9 of 175 countries submitted NAPs, with minimal systematic comparison or best practice identification; (5) Goal adjustment is possible through strategy reviews. A key limitation is that weak peer review and feedback mechanisms undermine recursive learning essential to experimentalist governance. While some experimentalist features exist, the IMO’s response only partially resembles this governance model, suggesting limited potential for addressing OA directly through experimentalist approaches.

This conclusion synthesises the book’s findings on ocean acidification (OA) governance. The study demonstrates that OA is a complex problem spanning ocean, atmosphere, and land systems with varying temporal and spatial dimensions. The current governance landscape constitutes a regime complex involving multiple institutions across different issue areas. Global experimentalist governance emerges as the most suitable approach because it can accommodate OA’s complexity and build upon existing fragmented governance structures. Two case studies – the Ocean Acidification Alliance and International Maritime Organization – reveal partial implementation of experimentalist governance features but significant limitations. Both institutions struggle with setting specific metrics, systematic reporting, peer review, and feedback mechanisms essential for recursive learning. Key obstacles include scientific uncertainty making concrete targets difficult, institutional reluctance towards delegation and provisionality, and weak communication across governance levels. Despite incomplete realisation, experimentalist governance remains promising for OA because it provides necessary flexibility and adaptability. The book concludes that while current institutions show experimentalist features, full implementation requires addressing institutional apprehensions and developing stronger communicative infrastructures for effective multilevel coordination in tackling this emerging environmental challenge.

Ocean acidification (OA) science has rapidly developed since 2005; however, international action remains limited. This chapter explains the complex scientific background of OA to non-scientists. OA is measured on a logarithmic pH scale, with oceans becoming 40 per cent more acidic since pre-industrial times. Three groups of compounds contribute to acidification: CO2 (the primary driver), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and sulphur oxides (SOx). These substances enter the oceans through various means, such as anthropogenic emissions, geoengineering, coastal activities, and scrubber effluents from ships. Additional ocean stressors, such as climate change, pollution, and overfishing, compound the effects of OA, making adaptation more challenging. OA threatens calcifying organisms such as corals and oysters, disrupts food webs, and impacts human ecosystem services valued at potentially $1 trillion annually by 2100. Adaptation options include blue carbon ecosystems, marine protected areas, and fisheries management. The issue encompasses ocean, atmosphere, and land systems across multiple timescales and spatial levels, necessitating diverse governance approaches that address both global CO2 emissions and local stressors.