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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 June 2026
This commentary questions whether rational contractualism, as exemplified by Nash, 1950 bargaining solutions, has moral import. While people may behave according to Nash equilibria, such agreements can be immoral or amoral. They are not necessarily moral. We explicitly queried participants about the morality of two such “rational” scenarios. In one, over 80% of participants considered the Nash Pareto-optimal outcome to be immoral, and in the other, a plurality of participants reached the same conclusion.
Target article
Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition
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Author response
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