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Outsourcing moral cognition: Delegation, diffusion of responsibility, and coalitional exclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Matthias Forstmann Open the ORCID record for Matthias Forstmann [Opens in a new window]  and
Alexa Weiss Open the ORCID record for Alexa Weiss [Opens in a new window]
Matthias Forstmann*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Zurich, Binzmühlestrasse 14, Zürich, CH-8050, Switzerland matthias.forstmann@uzh.ch
Alexa Weiss
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Bielefeld University, Germany Department of Psychology, University of Bonn, Germany alexa.weiss@uni-bonn.de
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Levine et al.’s resource-rational contractualism (RRC) models moral judgment as a cost-sensitive approximation to ideal bargaining among stakeholders. We identify three strategies agents use to reduce moral costs by outsourcing or bypassing virtual bargaining: strategic delegation, diffusion of responsibility, and coalitional boundary-setting. We propose extending RRC with parameters for agency transfer, responsibility tracking, and stakeholder inclusion to better capture real-world moral decision-making.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e141
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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