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Delegation to legitimate authority as a resource rational mechanism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Setayesh Radkani*
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA radkani@mit.edu saxe@mit.edu
Rebecca Saxe
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA radkani@mit.edu saxe@mit.edu
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

Diverse cognitive processes underlying human moral judgment can be understood as resource rational approximations of full bargaining of social contracts. We extend this theory by highlighting delegation to legitimate representatives as another key resource rational strategy. Considering delegation introduces a new set of cognitive mechanisms and heuristics that could be incorporated in a resource rational contractualist theory of morality.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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