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Institutions as cached computation for resource-rational negotiation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Muhua Huang
Affiliation:
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA muhua@stanford.edu University of Chicago Knowledge Lab and the Chicago Center for Computational Social Science, Chicago, IL, US
James Evans*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago Knowledge Lab and the Chicago Center for Computational Social Science, Chicago, IL, US Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM, USA jevans@uchicago.edu
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

Resource-rational contractualism explains human moral reasoning as efficient heuristics approximating idealized bargaining processes. Levine et al. compellingly model pairwise and small-group moral cognition, but overlook how institutions serve as computational shortcuts – pre-computed agreements that eliminate repeated negotiation. These cached computations can become rigid over time, driving new opportunities for flexible negotiation.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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