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Contractualist moral cognition needs a legalese-of-thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Kartik Chandra Open the ORCID record for Kartik Chandra [Opens in a new window]  and
Max Kleiman-Weiner Open the ORCID record for Max Kleiman-Weiner [Opens in a new window]
Kartik Chandra*
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, USA kach@mit.edu
Max Kleiman-Weiner
Affiliation:
University of Washington, 1410 NE Campus Parkway, Seattle, WA, USA maxkw@uw.edu
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

What exactly is a contract? In this commentary, we discuss the need for a formal theory of how contracts are represented in the mind. Drawing inspiration from the representation of real-world contracts, we suggest that probabilistic programs are an appealing candidate representation.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e137
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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