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Animals, future generations, and resource-rational contractualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Harry R. Lloyd*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Institutional mailing address: Philosophy Department, UNC Chapel Hill, Caldwell Hall, 240 East Cameron Ave., NC 27599, USA www.harryrlloyd.com hrl@unc.edu
*
*Corresponding author.

Abstract

Levine et al. understate the range of folk moral judgments that cannot be easily explained by their contractualist theory of moral cognition (including judgments about future generations and nonhuman animals). On the flipside, Levine et al. also overstate the range of moral judgments that cannot be easily explained by rival deontological or consequentialist theories of moral cognition.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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