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Moral cognition is contractualist, but does not work by simulating a bargaining process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Jean-Baptiste André Open the ORCID record for Jean-Baptiste André [Opens in a new window] ,
Léo Fitouchi  and
Nicolas Baumard
Jean-Baptiste André*
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France jeanbaptisteandre@gmail.com nbaumard@gmail.com
Léo Fitouchi
Affiliation:
Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Institute for Advanced Studies in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France leo.fitouchi@gmail.com
Nicolas Baumard
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France jeanbaptisteandre@gmail.com nbaumard@gmail.com
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

We agree with Levine et al. that moral judgments track outcomes that would emerge from a balanced bargaining process. But we challenge the claim that moral cognition must therefore simulate bargaining itself. Like any evolved system that exploits deep regularities without representing them, moral cognition can produce ideal contractualist judgments without mentally representing bargaining scenarios.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e134
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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