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Contractarian partiality, contractualist impartiality, and the question of falsifiability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Arthur Le Pargneux Open the ORCID record for Arthur Le Pargneux [Opens in a new window]
Arthur Le Pargneux*
Affiliation:
Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, Cambridge, MA, United States arthurlepargneux@fas.harvard.edu
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

The conflict between partiality and impartiality is a fundamental feature of moral cognition. It is also central within the contractualist tradition in moral philosophy. Resource-rational contractualism gives a key role to both partial (e.g., virtual bargaining) and impartial (e.g., universalization) forms of reasoning in its theory. In empirical tests, this makes it flexible, but at the risk of being unfalsifiable.

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Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e147
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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