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What is morality for? Contractualism versus global consequentialism and expected choiceworthiness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Falk Lieder Open the ORCID record for Falk Lieder [Opens in a new window] ,
Vanessa Cheung  and
Maximilian Maier
Falk Lieder*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA falk.lieder@psych.ucla.edu
Vanessa Cheung
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK vanessa.cheung.14@ucl.ac.uk maximilianmaier0401@gmail.com
Maximilian Maier
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, UK vanessa.cheung.14@ucl.ac.uk maximilianmaier0401@gmail.com
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Contractualism might not be the only computational-level theory of morality that can unify multiple moral mechanisms. Other moral theories can be combined with resource-rationality in the same way. Extending resource-rational analysis to other potential functions of morality (e.g., global consequentialism), combinations of multiple moral objectives, and additional moral mechanisms might allow us to explain many additional aspects of commonsense morality.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e148
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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