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Moral decision-making entails negotiation over the psychological mechanisms underlying decisions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Paul Conway Open the ORCID record for Paul Conway [Opens in a new window] ,
Jason Lam Open the ORCID record for Jason Lam [Opens in a new window]  and
Constanine Sedikides Open the ORCID record for Constanine Sedikides [Opens in a new window]
Paul Conway*
Affiliation:
B44 University Rd, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK p.conway@soton.ac.uk c.sedikides@soton.ac.uk Jason.Lam@soton.ac.uk
Jason Lam
Affiliation:
B44 University Rd, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK p.conway@soton.ac.uk c.sedikides@soton.ac.uk Jason.Lam@soton.ac.uk
Constanine Sedikides
Affiliation:
B44 University Rd, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK p.conway@soton.ac.uk c.sedikides@soton.ac.uk Jason.Lam@soton.ac.uk
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Levine et al. offer a compelling theory of moral decision-making, yet underemphasize the role of social perception. We argue that moral judgments function not only to evaluate actions but also to signal moral character. This signaling shapes social interactions and guides moral processing, highlighting the need to integrate reputational and relational dynamics into models of moral cognition.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e138
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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