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Navigating moral cognition under uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Kati Kish Bar-On Open the ORCID record for Kati Kish Bar-On [Opens in a new window]
Kati Kish Bar-On*
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Science, Technology and Society Program) 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, USA katik@mit.edu
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Bargaining requires agents to negotiate normative principles amid disagreement, incomplete information, and shifting social contexts, making uncertainty about moral rules and frameworks inherent to the decision process. In this commentary, I highlight the need for understanding how individuals resolve moral disagreements not just by applying fixed principles, but by navigating the uncertainty of which moral framework to adopt.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e135
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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