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The challenge of moral hierarchy in resource-rational contractualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2026

Peter Kardos Open the ORCID record for Peter Kardos [Opens in a new window]
Peter Kardos*
Affiliation:
Kean University, Union, NJ, USA pkardos@kean.edu
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*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Levine and colleagues present a model synthesizing different moral theories under a contractualist account. The relationship between decision-making processes may be less hierarchical than proposed. Decision incongruency, judgment preferences, and the persistence and influence of model-free decisions suggest that computational capacity alone doesn’t determine selection between various moral processes.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 49 , 2026 , e145
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

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