I explore and defend the unusual view that the replacement of matter taking place in the human body undermines egoistic reasons, and that we therefore have little or no basis for long-term egoistic concern. I begin by arguing that you should not have egoistic concern for a replica, i.e. a person resulting from a complete and sudden replacement of matter. I then argue that when it comes to egoistic concern, replication is not relevantly different from the slower and more gradual form of replacement found in human metabolism: if the former undermines egoistic reasons, so does the latter. I grant that the resulting view is, in some respects, hard to accept, but I conclude that we should at least treat it as a serious possibility.

Youth unemployment has been a primary concern for the European countries, especially after the 2008 Great Recession. In 2013 a Recommendation of the Council of the European Union established the Youth Guarantee (YG) as a political commitment to ensure that all young people receive a high-quality offer of employment, training or continued education within 4 months of becoming unemployed. To financially support the implementation of the YG in European countries and regions, the EU turned to the European Social Fund and created the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI). The YEI used regional disparities as a guiding criterion for the allocation of resources, but it has not been assessed at the regional level. We fill this gap by assessing the impact of the YEI on the labour market and educational outcomes of young people in EU regions that received funding between 2014 and 2018. The findings demonstrate that the YEI had a positive impact on youth opportunities in EU regions, supporting labour market integration and the return to education and training.

In the last decade, many scholars have sought to overcome the shortcomings of the reified conception of civil disobedience that was developed in the 1970s by offering alternative conceptions of (un)civil disobedience. The “disobedience framework” is now so predominant that it is almost unthinkable to refer to any protest involving an alleged infraction of official rules as anything other than disobedience. I argue that this overstretching of “disobedience” rests on the misleading assumption that “intentional lawbreaking” occurs in an uncontested political/legal space; it also ignores that, in certain contexts, activists insist on the legality of their protests even when they defy official orders. Examining how feminist activists in Turkey offer alternative interpretations of existing laws to challenge the legality of protest bans, I demonstrate that folding such protests into the disobedience framework silences protesters, erases their narratives of resistance, and adopts the state’s perspective on the “illegality” of their actions.

This paper renews the contemporary and enduring salience of archaic and discredited concepts of spatiality and physical geographic determinism, but historicises, repurposes and reworks them: it is an essay in critical and decolonial palaeo-territorialisation. Concreteness may well have been misplaced, but place – and space – might not have been altogether mis-concretised. Rethinking the global is an opportunity to step back and think about macro-scales and macro-scalarity more broadly. This paper exhumes and decolonially/critically reappropriates Carl Schmitt’s Großraum concept (re-examining, along the way, if not quite rehabilitating the Meer und Land thesis and Mackinder’s ‘geographical pivot’ (Mackinder 1904)) as a heuristic device to explore the overlooked scales of continents and continentality in the genealogy of a global geographic imaginary that is as much geotectonic as geo-historical. ‘The Global’ would then come to signify pre-eminently – or perhaps has always signified – as the intercontinental rather than the international: a space or set of spaces in some ultimate sense conditioned by the configuration of the planetary crust yet nonetheless produced through historical processes. We may never have been global, but we have been (inter)continental for the last half-millennium. State sovereignty, (racial) capitalism, colonialism, imperialism, public international law, fascism, communism and neoliberal globalisation have all been projects or formations – directly or indirectly, by design or accident – producing, pursuing, exploiting, organising and ordering continental Großräume. Contemporary regional trade blocs, regional international governmental organisations, regional human rights systems, military alliances and even putative civilisational divides all reflect the perdurable continental horizons of our ostensibly global imaginary.

Psychiatrists and anthropologists both rely on observation, discourse analysis and access to participants’ internal and external worlds. Ethnographic fieldwork, a key method in medical anthropology, offers a powerful tool to establish a robust evidence base of how to address mental health inequalities in ethnic minority communities.

After World War II, Japan was severely degraded, and its people were generally devastated. For the country’s very survival, the beleaguered Japanese people sought to rebuild economically and reputationally. During this postwar period, Japanese business, union, and government leaders grappled with lagging progress and the necessary abandonment of prior transwar social and business arrangements. They sought new strategies to stimulate advancement in the wake of a governmental vacuum, labor unrest, and the threat of communism. In this context, Moral Re-Armament (MRA) took root in some areas of Japan during the period when Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from $102 billion in 1945 to $420 billion by 1961. MRA introduced Western-oriented societal values, intended to help nurture individual and societal change, including collaborative relations between unions and management. Of the first eight Japanese prime ministers after World War II, six either worked openly with or endorsed the MRA movement.

Childhood maltreatment can lead to poor socioemotional development, which may undermine parental functioning in adulthood. Having a large social network of relatives and friends, however, might buffer the effects of childhood maltreatment on parents. This prediction was examined using prospective data from the Minnesota Longitudinal Study of Risk Adaptation (N = 173). Early childhood maltreatment was assessed prospectively at ages 0 – 5. Socioemotional competence during middle childhood and adolescence (ages 5 – 16) was assessed via teacher reports. Adult parenting was assessed using a semi-structured interview at age 32 (N = 106) and dyadic parent-child observations at various ages (N = 85). At age 32, participants also wrote the names of friends and relatives in their inner, middle, and outer social circles. In a moderated mediation analysis, childhood maltreatment forecasted low socioemotional competence, which in turn predicted more negative parental orientations (greater hostility and lower emotional connectedness and involvement) and lower observed parental support in adulthood. However, having a large social network and having friends in one’s inner circle buffered this effect. These results highlight the significance of social networks in supporting parents who were maltreated in childhood, and primarily the importance of close friends.

Aotearoa New Zealand’s recognition of the Whanganui River as a legal person in 2017 has generated a lively debate. While advocates argue that ascribing personhood to natural entities is a powerful tool for redressing historical injustices against Indigenous peoples and for protecting the environment, critics argue that it is incompatible with Western legal and political systems. In this article, we use Thomas Hobbes’s theory of personhood to develop a novel account of ecological personhood. Hobbes explains how natural entities can be empowered to speak and act through authorized representatives, much as states, corporations, and wards do. Our Hobbesian account has three main payoffs. First, it offers a bridge between different legal orders and ontologies of nature. Second, it explains how “ecoship” is normatively different from corporate personhood and guardianship. Third, it highlights both the transformative potential of ecological persons and the ways in which they can be coopted and subverted.