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The High Commissioner for India, Sir S. E. Runganadhan (1877–1966), extolled the work of the Indian Comforts Fund (ICF) in the foreword to the fund's War Record as ‘a remarkable piece of humanitarian work carried out during the war largely by British women for the benefit of India's fighting men and merchant seamen’. After providing a short overview of the fund's work between 1939 and 1945, the High Commissioner expressed his and his country's gratitude by writing, ‘India will ever remain deeply indebted to them [the members of the fund's executive committee and the host of unseen helpers throughout Great Britain] for this practical expression of their sympathy and goodwill towards her.’ Although the imperial tone of this message, coming from the High Commissioner appointed by the colonial government in Delhi, might not come as a surprise, the used framing of India's indebtedness for British humanitarian assistance to Indian soldiers and merchant seamen (lascars) who had done their share to contribute to Britain's and the empire's war effort must have been puzzling for many contemporaries on the subcontinent. Next to doubting the underlying idea of the voluntariness of India's war contribution, they might also have raised questions about who should be indebted to whom.
Early in the war, the fund's public appeals for support in the form of knitted comforts and donations had struck a different note. Back in the spring of 1940, the fund had justified its appeal by emphasising that Indian soldiers had ‘come so far across the sea to help in our [the British] war effort’.
How can a political society established in one port city in Revolutionary France be a ‘global’ actor? This article examines the revolutionary Society of Lorient, an Atlantic port founded to be the seat of the French East India Company, as a case study of the viability of the ‘micro-spatial’ approach to global history outlined by Christian De Vito. It considers how the Lorient Society positioned itself as an intermediary between global concerns and the French national authorities, as well as the Society’s evolving perspective on global imperial rivalries in their relationship to revolution, the ‘rights of man’, trade, war, race, and slavery. In doing so, it shows how a seemingly local actor could help construct the global in the context of the ‘Age of Revolution(s)’ of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The armistice of November 1918 did not mean an end to suffering or the need for humanitarian aid. On the contrary, Europe, Russia and the Middle East faced protracted humanitarian emergencies in the months and years that followed. Refugee crises emerged next to war-related displacements in the wake of the disintegration of former empires and the drawing of new borders during peace conferences. As a consequence of the Armenian Genocide and the Bolshevik Revolution, masses of people fled or were resettled, forcibly expelled or evicted. The subsequent civil wars in former Russia, the conflicts in Eastern Europe and the population exchange between Turkey and Greece – the outcome of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and overseen by the League of Nations – produced new waves of displaced persons and desperate refugees in need of support. At the same time, millions of prisoners of war waited, often in miserable conditions, for their repatriation, while famine conditions prevailed in parts of Austria and Germany, reinforced by the Allied blockade, and a terrible famine spread in Soviet Russia between 1921 and 1923.
All these humanitarian emergencies demanded comprehensive continued or new relief efforts, a call that was taken up by established actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the national Red Cross societies and the Quakers, as well as newcomers in the field, such as Save the Children, the American Relief Administration, Near East Relief, the International Workers’ Relief, and the League of Nations.
In 1917, a small group of women, some of whom had just come out of purdah, began to meet regularly for Red Cross work in Birbhum, Bengal. Called upon by Saroj Nalini Dutt (1887–1925), a Bengali social reformer and early rural development activist, the members of the Birbhum Mahilā Samiti (Birbhum women's group) sewed garments and made dātuns (teeth-cleaning sticks) made from the neem tree as well as pacīsī boards (an Indian game) for Indian soldiers fighting in the First World War. Dutt, who was honoured for her activities after the war by the British Red Cross Society (BRCS), also sent a monthly consignment of sweets, condiments, and newspapers to soldiers serving in Mesopotamia. The Birbhum group, which normally focused its activities on the social and educational ‘progress’ of Bengali women, is only one of the many examples of Indian non-state humanitarian initiatives organised during the First World War. Given that these initiatives were embedded in the British imperial context and contributed to the empire's war effort, they are examples of a larger phenomenon that historians before me have labelled ‘imperial humanitarianism’.
Two decades later, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), the future prime minister of independent India, and by then, President of the Indian National Congress (INC), became involved in propagating and organising Indian nationalist humanitarian activities. During the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), Nehru swayed the Indian national movement to create its own humanitarian programme, which saw the collection of funds and food items in favour of Republican Spain.
Most suicides happen following maladaptive coping among suicide survivors; however, coping mechanisms adopted by refugee suicide survivors, especially in Uganda, have hardly been studied. This study assessed the coping mechanisms adopted following suicide attempts among refugees in humanitarian settings in Northern Uganda. A concurrent mixed-methods design was used to study adult refugee-suicide survivors of South Sudanese origin. They were consecutively sampled across four settlements and engaged in structured, in-depth interviews. Data were analyzed in SPSS version 25 using descriptive statistics, while qualitative data were analyzed thematically. Fewer than a quarter (17%) of suicide attempts were coped with adaptively. Most refugees coped emotionally by rarely accepting sympathy and understanding (37.5%), frequently trying to keep their feelings to themselves (50.0%), self-blame (50.0%), self-isolation (62.5%), making a plan to act (37.5%), bursting out in anger and other emotions (75.0%), and having fantasies or wishes about how things might turn out (62.5%). These coping mechanisms were congruent with those identified in the qualitative exploration. Refugees in Northern Uganda with a history of suicide attempts maladaptively cope with that history, implying that they could be at high risk of repeated suicide attempts and potentially suicide, based on evidence shown in previous studies.
The growing relevance of global administrative structures within transnational law is not an immediate space in which one would seek climate justice. The constraints of these structures have, in the past, prevented states from being able to achieve environmentally motivated regulatory changes. There are significant examples of corporate actors using investment treaties to protect their interests in the face of states’ environmentally focused law-making. However, there is a growing awareness of the environment in both treaty language and arbitral decisions in international investment law. An opening may be emerging for climate justice to extend into these global regulatory frameworks and even be elevated by the systems that had once constrained it. This chapter attempts to identify these openings.
Climate action, in its limited (albeit growing) possibilities within existing legal frameworks, is typically manifested by private actors bringing claims based on global, regional, or local climate concerns to courts. Despite the decidedly global nature of the issue, the litigation options are more common at the local and regional levels because of the laws available and jurisdictional limitations. Climate justice is often realized in domestic courts, applying local laws but often framed around broader international commitments. Many of these claims brought in the past years involve transnational litigants or issues, attempting to expose states’ or companies’ failures to implement environmentally sound policies (see infra chapter 12, Julia Stefanello Pires, ‘Leading Climate Cases Against Corporate Actors: Understanding Business Accountability for Human Rights Impacts Related to Climate Change’; for example, Milieudefensie et al. v Royal Dutch Shell plc., C/09/571932 / HA ZA 19-379, 26 May 2021; Urgenda Foundation v State of the Netherlands, HA ZA C/09/00456689, 13 January 2020).
We show that there exist constants $\delta _1,\delta _2\gt 0$ such that if $G$ is an $(n,d,\lambda )$-graph with $\lambda /d\le \delta _1$, then $G$ contains an induced cycle of length at least $\delta _2n/d$. We further demonstrate that, up to a constant factor, this is best possible. Utilising our techniques, we derive that the number of non-isomorphic induced subgraphs of such $G$ is at least exponential in $n\log d/d$, and further demonstrate that this is tight up to a constant factor in the exponent.
In the realm of global governance, the unique status and authority of expertise have traditionally been associated with its claims to rely on science and its often-associated qualities of ‘neutrality’, ‘impartiality’, and ‘objectivity’. Policymakers and technocratic experts have widely resorted to these attributes to render their knowledge credible and authoritative. While such claims to scientificity remain significant, we contend that contemporary global governance increasingly relies on alternative practices to confer knowledge its expert status. Global sites of governance are nowadays engaging in a broader set of practices of knowledge production and packaging, which include participatory experiments, aesthetic performances, calls to the imagination, and repertoires of benevolence. Such practices of knowledge pluralization have largely been seen as positive and unproblematic moves. Without contesting the need to pluralize expertise, we argue that such practices are not inherently democratizing, but part of an evolving technocratic repertoire of governing. Our introduction is structured around four sections: 1) a justification for the issue and contribution to the literature on expertise in International Relations; 2) the conditions of possibility or ‘context’ of the pluralization of expertise; 3) a discussion of novel practices of knowledge authorization and of their politics; and 4) an outline of our main contributions.
Historically the United States uses both bilateral aid and influence over multilateral development finance to further its geopolitical objectives. Past studies explain the choice between these two instruments based on either a divided government effect or whether the recipient government is a traditional US ally (the dirty work hypothesis). We advance a theory explaining the bilateral/multilateral choice in terms of the confluence of these factors and test its predictions using United Nations Security Council voting, US bilateral aid flows, and World Bank lending. Results confirm theoretical expectations: higher bilateral aid goes to allies who support the United States in the Security Council but only when the US government is not divided and higher World Bank lending goes to non-allies who support the United States in the Security Council but only when the US government is divided. This detailed understanding of the link between domestic politics and governance in international organizations has important implications as the international order moves beyond a US-dominated system.
Climate change has unequal effects on people in different parts of the world. Small Island Developing States face real and existential threats to their land and way of life on account of a crisis in which they have had little or no role to play, and with limited opportunity to take corrective action (Burkett 2015). Countries in Asia continue to be plastic havens for Europe, which for years has exploited weaker regulation in these regions. This has turned lands and oceans in Asia into toxic wastelands, while European countries continue to consume resources in an irresponsible and unabated fashion (Ellis-Petersen 2019). In 2023, we see the continued exploitation of critical minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where there is a mineral race between the United States, Europe, and China (Kara 2023). This continued extraction has resulted in violence, war, and poverty and is often argued to be the result of a ‘failed state’ or ‘poor governance’ (Peša 2022).
However, this only tells a partial story. The existence of such extraction is on account of the ways in which people and communities have been marginalized as a result of a wide variety of economic, political, social, and structural factors on a global scale (Harlan et al. 2015). In fact, as Sultana argues, the root cause of much of the climate emergency that we are experiencing is on account of historical as well as ongoing exploitation of formerly colonized lands (Sultana 2022).
Palmer amaranth (Amaranthus palmeri S. Watson) is a highly competitive and drought-tolerant weed that poses significant challenges to U.S. agriculture due to its adaptability, prolific seed production, and herbicide resistance. Understanding how water stress at specific growth stages affects its development and seed production is critical for optimizing management strategies, particularly in water-limited environments. This study evaluated the effects of growth stage–specific water stress on growth and fecundity of A. palmeri under controlled greenhouse conditions. Four irrigation levels (100%, 80%, 60%, and 40% field capacity [FC]) were applied during vegetative and reproductive stages. Increasing water stress significantly reduced plant height, stem diameter, and biomass, with reductions of 17% to 35% under severe stress (40% FC). Total biomass declined by approximately 17% under severe water limitation. Root biomass at 60% FC decreased by 13% to 14% relative to 100% FC, whereas root length density increased by 11% to 16%, indicating adaptive root elongation under severe water deficit conditions. Despite reductions in vegetative growth, A. palmeri maintained high reproductive capacity. Seed production at 100% FC was 48% to 72% higher than at 80% FC and more than 2- to 3-fold greater than at 60% FC. Furthermore, plants subjected to reproductive-stage stress produced approximately 29% more seeds than those stressed during the vegetative stage, highlighting strong stage-dependent reproductive plasticity. Seed germination was highest at 100% FC but declined by approximately 55% at 60% FC. In contrast, germination at 80% FC remained within 10% of optimal levels and was comparable under 40% FC, suggesting a nonlinear response and potential maternal effects enhancing seed resilience under stress. The study revealed the importance of early-season weed control to exploit periods of vulnerability and limit seedbank replenishment. Overall, this study provides valuable insights for integrating weed management strategies in dryland cropping systems, where water scarcity and herbicide resistance present ongoing challenges.
Global companies develop as internationally integrated entities, but they are not subject to a common regulatory framework. Despite being among the main contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, these companies do not have their activities regulated in relation to climate issues either (RUGGIE 2014, 13). Although they contribute to the causes of global warming (IPCC 2007, 449), they are not obliged to assume their own share of responsibility for GHG emissions, nor are they held responsible for the consequences and impacts of climate change. In July 2022, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly declared that the right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment is a human right (UN 2022). This resolution also recognized that climate change poses serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to effectively enjoy all human rights.
Addressing the business responsibility to respect human rights, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) unanimously endorsed the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) in June 2011. Although it does not specifically address climate issues, the UNGPs states that businesses have a responsibility to respect internationally recognized human rights, which includes not violating human rights and addressing any negative impacts their activities may cause (UN 2011). However, these documents are voluntary and do not provide any sanctions for parties who do not respect their terms and principles.
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) play a crucial role in promoting compliance with international norms through fact-finding and on-site monitoring missions. Many of these missions take place in authoritarian regimes, which often employ various tactics to control and suppress critics both domestically and internationally. Yet, in some cases, authoritarian states permit IGO missions to operate with little or no interference and may even establish collaborative relationships in politically sensitive issue areas. This study examines this puzzle by asking why and when IGO on-site monitoring missions can persist and foster collaboration in authoritarian contexts, a dynamic I label a pragmatic partnership. Theoretically, I argue that two key conditions must be met for such partnerships to emerge: international pressure and the development of interpersonal trust. However, I also contend that these partnerships can generate contestation, risk legitimizing autocratic practices, and marginalize pro-democratic forces. Empirically, I illustrate my argument through an in-depth analysis of the International Labour Organization (ILO)’s monitoring mission on child labour and forced labour in Uzbekistan. Methodologically, I employ process tracing covering the period 2005–2022 and draw on multiple sources of evidence. While such partnerships can contribute to incremental compliance with international norms, I also show that they generate contestation, risk legitimizing autocratic practices, and may marginalize pro-democratic forces.