This paper draws attention to a group of neighborhoods that are the object of heated elite discussions in many European countries. Using Sweden as our case, we demonstrate the feasibility of conducting high-quality surveys with residents in neighborhoods where large shares have an immigrant background and low socioeconomic status. Moreover, we develop a measurement that allows us to assess what residents in two of Sweden's politicized and vulnerable neighborhoods think is needed to improve the social order of their local areas. We find that residents believe that neighborhood problems are generally about a lack of social control between people and that residents are not preoccupied with culture clash issues. Overall, beliefs about what contributes to social order are structured, largely homogenous and independent of elite discourse. Based on a comparison with a nationally representative sample, we conclude that residents in vulnerable neighborhoods and residents in other neighborhoods share a similar worldview and approach to daily life, but that the need for local social order is more keenly felt in the vulnerable neighborhoods.

How do people perceive the utility of redistribution? Support for redistribution is commonly understood as being determined by self‐interest in a way that is monotonically proportional to expected net transfers. However, this would imply that average support for redistribution is static and unaffected by changes in the distribution of incomes. This study addresses this incongruence by integrating concepts from the literature on redistribution preferences, namely the diminishing marginal utility of income, inequity aversion and loss aversion. These concepts are formalized by making two distinctions regarding redistribution: absolute versus relative utility and gains versus losses. An analysis of the European/World Values Survey suggests that the preferences of the poor are determined by absolute gains, while the preferences of the rich are determined by relative losses. In other words, the poor care about how much they gain from redistribution, while the rich care about the share of their income that they lose from it. The findings have important implications for the relationships among public opinion, economic development and income inequality.

Growing evidence exists about the importance of dark personality traits – narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism – in political leaders, broadly leading to heightened political aggressiveness and partisan conflict. Building on this expanding research agenda, we study the possible association between dark personality in politicians and deepened affective polarization – that is, increased affective distance between partisan groups coupled with stronger dislike for out‐parties – in the public. We do so by linking a large‐scale expert survey (NEGex) and a collection of post‐election surveys (CSES), including information for more than 90 leading candidates having competed in 40 elections worldwide. Our results show that the dark personality of top politicians can be associated with upticks in affective polarization in the public – but only when it comes to the personality of in‐party candidates (that is, a candidate from voters' preferred party), and only for high levels of ideological proximity between the candidate and the voter.

Do attacks against politicians exacerbate the political underrepresentation of marginalized groups? Existing research suggests that candidates and officeholders from underrepresented groups are more likely to become targets of political violence, but little is known about the consequences of indirect exposure to political violence for descriptive representation and political ambition. Focusing on the case of women in politics, we study how the prevalence of political violence affects both the descriptive representation and the political ambition of women in Germany – Europe's largest democracy. Combining an analysis of observational data measuring crimes against politicians with evidence from original and pre‐registered survey experiments, we first demonstrate that attacks on political elites are not associated with fewer female candidates on party lists for local elections. Examining political ambitions and underlying microfoundations with different samples of respondents varying in their likelihood of considering political candidacy, we provide survey‐experimental evidence that information about the prevalence of political crime does not reduce willingness to run for office or engage in politics among female respondents with high political interest but may do so among those with low political interest. Taken together, this study highlights the resilience of underrepresented groups in the face of increasing political violence. However, we also show that political violence may create a pipeline problem if it deters the wider population of women from even considering to run for office.

A plethora of accumulating crises, and the public frustration with how they were tackled, have provided fertile ground for growing public scepticism towards the European Union (EU). The way in which political leaders manage these crises may well decide the future of the EU. Research has addressed these developments comprehensively. However, it has not, to date, provided an adequate analytical lens to confront the crisis theme explicitly and therefore needs analytical advancement. We contribute to the debate by developing a framework for comparative analysis and evaluation of public political crisis communication, identifying four aspects along which public political crisis communication can be analysed: (1) how accessible it is, (2) how well it can contribute to allaying fears, (3) to what extent it accommodates public concerns, and (4) how politically aligned crisis managers are in their communication. We analyse a dataset of 10 years of speeches and press releases of the governments of Austria, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom in addition to the EU's executive institutions (EU Commission and Councils). Drawing on different approaches to automated text analysis, we score texts on the four identified dimensions and draw dimensions together in a holistic similarity index. Results demonstrate the cohesion of crisis‐relevant communication in contrast to non‐relevant communication. They also show that accommodation, is consistently emphasised more in crisis than in non‐crisis communication; however, political crisis managers have practiced a politics of fear rather than allaying concerns, potentially fuelling political frustration and disenchantment. In addition, the EU's crisis communication is not found to be different from communication about non‐crisis topics, opening up avenues for future research concerned with legitimation processes at different political levels. Overall, the results do partly resonate with the insights provided by the existing literature but also shine a new, holistic light on how political executives have managed crises in the past decade.

A certain type of citizen holds technocratic views. They favour pragmatic problem solving through scientific and technical expertise, and reject party politics for being harmful to the common good. Yet, empirical evidence on the ideological profile of these citizens is fragmented and inconclusive. Using an original survey in Western Europe, Australia and the United States, we test predictions about the left−right alignment of citizens with technocratic attitudes on the economic and cultural dimensions of politics. We argue that technocracy is not antithetical to ideology and that citizens holding technocratic attitudes are not immune to ideological positions. Findings show that technocratic citizens are more economically left-wing than mainstream voters, contrary to common associations of technocracy with neoliberal economic principles. However, they are more centrist than populists. This highlights that, in addition to a representational challenge, technocracy mounts an ideological challenge to party-based representative democracy. In times of cumulative crises, which put democracies under stress with demands for competence and effectiveness, these findings offer insights about the appeal of alternative forms of representation.

Do individuals with right‐wing populist ideologies have higher violence‐justification attitudes than those supporting different political ideologies? While the literature has confirmed the association between political violence and populism, research on which components of populist ideologies relate to individual attitudes towards political violence is relatively scarce. Based on 18 European democracies, this research note examines whether right‐wing populist individuals are more likely to justify political violence to pursue their political goals. The analyses reveal that right‐wing populists are generally more likely to justify political violence compared to mainstream voters and non‐voters. Additionally, left‐wing populist voters also support political violence, although the effect size is comparatively smaller. This indicates that voters’ radicalisation depends on populist ideologies rather than left‐right ideological distinctions. The effect among right‐wing populists depends on city residence, gender and immigration status. Subsequent analyses suggest that right‐wing populists’ attitudes towards violence are not conditional on nativism or anti‐immigration perceptions. These findings contribute to the general understanding of the nature and consequences of populism.

This paper presents a logic programming-based framework for policy-aware autonomous agents that can reason about potential penalties for noncompliance and act accordingly. While prior work has primarily focused on ensuring compliance, our approach considers scenarios where deviating from policies may be necessary to achieve high-stakes goals. Additionally, modeling noncompliant behavior can assist policymakers by simulating realistic human decision-making. Our framework extends Gelfond and Lobo’s Authorization and Obligation Policy Language ($\mathscr{AOPL}$) to incorporate penalties and integrates Answer Set Programming (ASP) for reasoning. Compared to previous approaches, our method ensures well-formed policies, accounts for policy priorities, and enhances explainability by explicitly identifying rule violations and their consequences. Building on the work of Harders and Inclezan, we introduce penalty-based reasoning to distinguish between noncompliant plans, prioritizing those with minimal repercussions. To support this, we develop an automated translation from the extended $\mathscr{AOPL}$ into ASP and refine ASP-based planning algorithms to account for incurred penalties. Experiments in two domains demonstrate that our framework generates higher-quality plans that avoid harmful actions while, in some cases, also improving computational efficiency. These findings underscore its potential for enhancing autonomous decision-making and informing policy refinement.

We consider the countably many families $\mathcal {L}_d$, $d\in \mathbb {N}_{\geq 2}$, of K3 surfaces admitting an elliptic fibration with positive Mordell–Weil rank. We prove that the elliptic fibrations on the very general member of these families have the potential Mordell–Weil rank jump property for $d\neq 2,3$ and moreover the Mordell–Weil rank jump property for $d\equiv 3\ \mod 4$, $d\neq 3$. We provide explicit examples and discuss some extensions to subfamilies. The result is based on the geometric interaction between the (potential) Mordell–Weil rank jump property and the presence of special multisections of the fibration.

What can policy makers do in day-to-day decision making to strengthen citizens' belief that the political system is legitimate? Much literature has highlighted that the realization of citizens' personal preferences in policy making is an important driver of legitimacy beliefs. We argue that citizens, in addition, also care about whether a policy represents the preferences of the majority of citizens, even if their personal preference diverges from the majority's. Using the case of the European Union (EU) as a system that has recurringly experienced crises of public legitimacy, we conduct a vignette survey experiment in which respondents assess the legitimacy of fictitious EU decisions that vary in how they were taken and whose preferences they represent. Results from original surveys conducted in the five largest EU countries show that the congruence of EU decisions not only with personal opinion but also with different forms of majority opinion significantly strengthens legitimacy beliefs. We also show that the most likely mechanism behind this finding is the application of a ‘consensus heuristic’, by which respondents use majority opinion as a cue to identify legitimate decisions. In contrast, procedural features such as the consultation of interest groups or the inclusiveness of decision making in the institutions have little effect on legitimacy beliefs. These findings suggest that policy makers can address legitimacy deficits by strengthening majority representation, which will have both egotropic and sociotropic effects.

Do border closures affect political attitudes? While a large body of research has discussed the effects of the COVID‐19 pandemic on nationalism and outgroup hostility, much less is known about how one of the main policy responses to stop the virus, closing the national borders, has impacted political attitudes. We argue that the sudden and unprecedented closures of national borders in the COVID‐19 crisis decreased EU support and increased hostility towards immigrants. These closures signalled that people from across the border are a threat to public health and showed little trust in European governance. We have collected fine‐grained regional data on COVID‐19‐related border closures in Germany that we matched with survey data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel. We rely on a difference‐in‐differences design to estimate the causal effect of closed borders on European identity and outgroup hostility. While we find that border closures decrease EU support and increase hostility towards immigrants, these effects fade away relatively quickly. Hence, our study suggests that border closures have only limited impact on political attitudes. Our findings have important implications for the growing literature on border politics in the EU and elsewhere.

While public opinion about foreign policy has been studied extensively in the United States, there is less systematic research of foreign policy opinions in other countries. Given that public opinion about international affairs affects who gets elected in democracies and then constrains the foreign policies available to leaders once elected, both comparative politics and international relations scholarship benefit from more systematic investigation of foreign policy attitudes outside the United States. Using new data, this article presents a common set of core constructs structuring both American and European attitudes about foreign policy. Surveys conducted in four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany) provide an expanded set of foreign policy‐related survey items that are analysed using exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM). Measurement equivalence is specifically tested and a common four‐factor structure that fits the data in all four countries is found. Consequently, valid, direct comparisons of the foreign policy preferences of four world powers are made. In the process, the four‐factor model confirms and expands previous work on the structure of foreign policy attitudes. The article also demonstrates the capability of ESEM in testing the dimensionality and cross‐national equivalence of social science concepts.

In a rising number of countries, populist parties participate in coalition governments. While there exists a consensus that populism is incompatible with core tenets of liberal democracy on a conceptual level, we know much less about whether or not the participation of populist parties in government constitutes a threat to liberal democracy in practice. We study the impact of populist parties in coalition governments using a novel dataset of more than 2000 laws that were under review at the Austrian Constitutional Court between 1980 and 2021. We provide evidence that the court did not find laws passed by governments that included a populist party unconstitutional more often than those passed by non‐populist governments. Our findings indicate that the Austrian Freedom Party did moderate its policy while in office. The results imply that it is necessary to distinguish policy positions in party manifestos and party rhetoric from policies actually implemented by governments.

Stigmatisation has been recognised as a major factor influencing the fortunes of populist radical right (PRR) parties. While scholars have examined it by taking parties as units of analysis, this study focuses on the individual level by asking Which PRR party members are more likely to feel stigmatised? After offering a novel theoretical explanation for feelings of stigmatisation based on the personal networks in which PRR grassroots members are embedded, it then investigates stigma using an original membership survey of about 7,000 members of the Sweden Democrats (SD) and interviews with 30 of them. The survey results show that the higher the educational qualification PRR grassroots members have achieved, the more likely they will feel stigmatised. In addition, those who have never had any relatives and/or friends in the SD, and those who are employed in the public sector, are more likely to consider membership discrediting. The interview data shed light on the survey results, by illustrating how public employees and university students find it hard to be open about their membership as they are surrounded by people with left‐wing views. By contrast, having relatives and/or friends who are members of the party reduces the stigma of joining PRR parties, becoming active in them, and talking about politics in public. Along with countering some of the prevailing wisdom about stigmatisation in PRR parties, the findings contribute to our understanding of PRR grassroots membership, which has long been an overlooked topic in the literature.

The European Union relies on decentralised agencies to implement important transnational regulations, such as certifying the safety of medicines. However, the authority of these agencies does not have ‘hard’ legal status and crucially depends on disseminating ideas and information effectively: what can be termed ‘political entrepreneurship’. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the political entrepreneurship of EU agencies by constructing a conceptual typology of entrepreneurial strategies. Drawing conceptually on transnational public administration, a new database is constructed of the ‘entrepreneurship’ of 33 EU agencies in 2014 based on their media communication activities, face‐to‐face networking in workshops and collaborations, and knowledge dissemination and ‘learning’ exercises. This is mapped against the political salience of agencies in the European Parliament and media. The mapping exercise shows four types of entrepreneurial strategies covering the population of EU agencies: technical functional, insulating, network‐seeking and politicised. The typology is validated through semi‐structured interviews in 11 EU agencies, showing the core characteristics of each type of strategy. The article concludes by arguing that this typology provides an important addition to existing categories of EU agencies based on autonomy and accountability, and advocates a future research strategy examining the interaction between agencies’ entrepreneurial strategies and the expectations and reactions of stakeholder audiences.

What explains the variation in public support for European integration? While the existing literature has predominantly focused on economic, cultural and political factors, the influence of geography has been largely overlooked. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by examining the impact of residing in the European Union (EU) border regions on voters' perceptions and attitudes towards the EU. Contrary to previous research, our study reveals a remarkable pattern, indicating that individuals living in border regions exhibit a higher propensity to vote for Eurosceptic parties and hold negative views on the EU. Through the utilization of both behavioural and attitudinal indicators in years ranging between 1999 and 2021 and employing statistical matching, our analysis robustly supports this finding. Moreover, we delve into the underlying mechanisms driving these negative attitudes in border regions, highlighting the significance of institutional factors. A mediation analysis reveals an interesting and previously unexplored theoretical twist: We find that residing in a border region is associated with lower trust in national political institutions, which translates into distrust in the EU. These findings suggest that it might be policymakers residing in the capital of the country rather than people on the other side of the border that make borderland inhabitants' attitudes distinctly negative.

A large literature studies whether, and under what circumstances, voters will electorally punish corrupt politicians. Yet this literature has to date neglected the empirical prevalence of transnational dimensions to real‐world corruption allegations, even as corruption studies undergo a ‘transnational turn’. We use a survey experiment in the United Kingdom in 2020 to investigate whether voters differentially punish politicians associated with transnational corruption and test four different potential mechanisms: information salience, country‐based discrimination, economic nationalism and expected representation. We find evidence suggesting that voters indeed differentially punish transnational corruption, but only when it involves countries perceived negatively by the public (i.e. a ‘Moscow‐based firm’). This is most consistent with a mechanism of country‐based discrimination, while we find no evidence consistent with any other mechanism. These results suggest that existing experimental studies might understate the potential for electoral accountability by neglecting real‐world corruption allegations’ frequent transnational dimension.

This article develops a novel approach for studying the influence of supranational institutions in international cooperation. While earlier research tends to treat member states as a collective yielding influence on supranational institutions, we unpack this collective to explore differentiated supranational influence. To this end, the article makes three contributions. First, it develops a method for measuring differentiated supranational influence that makes it possible to identify which member states give ground when a supranational institution is influential. Second, it theorizes the sources of differentiated supranational influence, arguing that states are more likely to accommodate a supranational institution when they are more dependent on the resources of this institution. Third, it illustrates the usefulness of this approach empirically through an analysis of the influence of the European Commission in European Union bargaining. The analysis suggests that our approach can measure and explain differentiated supranational influence under conditions of both heightened crisis and everyday politics.

While representing the next generation of democratic citizens, research on process preferences of adolescents is in its infancy. To analyse what institutional designs adolescents favour, we conducted a conjoint experiment with a unique, representative sample of 1,970 German pupils between the age of 14–17. We find that adolescents in general are ‘status quo’– democrats, preferring a parliament (representing the central institution of the existing representative system) to alternative institutions, namely citizen forums and an assertive leader. However, support for the status quo comes with several qualifications, namely expert input, slow and considerate political processes and a final referendum. Furthermore, we find differences between subgroups, whereby dissatisfied adolescents are more open to citizen forums and an assertive leader than satisfied adolescents. By contrast, more sophisticated adolescents have stronger preferences for the parliament as the main institution. Overall, our results suggest that a major overhaul of the democratic infrastructure does not seem to be a priority for the next generation of citizens, although there is some desire for innovation, namely the ‘blending’ of representative institutions with more citizen participation.

Simultaneous interpreting (SI), a challenging task enabled by bilingualism, is claimed to distinctly tax working memory (WM). However, causal designs are missing, limiting our understanding of the phenomenon. We recruited 50 Chinese-English bilinguals and assessed their WM performance (alongside inhibitory and fluency outcomes) before and after L1–L2 SI or a control task (text comprehension). WM scores (especially under high-demand, multimodal conditions) increased after text comprehension but not after SI, adjusting for age of L2 appropriation, years of L2 use, L2 proficiency and SI competence. Of note, WM was assessed immediately before and after SI, ruling out other cognitive influences. Conversely, no distinct patterns were observed on inhibitory or fluency tasks. Briefly, this activity seems to hinder practice-related WM gains – a finding that expands contemporary accounts of interpreting.