According to the value-free ideal of science, scientists should draw their conclusions in a manner free of influence from value judgments. This ideal lends itself to a variety of interpretations and specifications. The ideal also faces numerous challenges that call into question not only whether it can be achieved but whether it really constitutes an ideal scientists ought to use to guide their actions. The chapter considers whether and in what conditions the value judgments of scientists might prevent or facilitate the achievement of scientific objectivity. From the role of value judgments in science the chapter turns to the closely related question of the appropriate role of scientists in the formulation of public policies. In many situations, the consideration of scientific evidence and scientific research bears importantly on questions of policy. The chapter then considers the complicated relationship between the reliance of policymakers on scientific expertise and the goals of democratic accountability and the public good.
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