International Negotiation Process and Strategies

THROUGHOUT this book, we have examined what it takes to get a mutually acceptable and desirable negotiation outcome. In understanding the effect of a behavior and strategies in negotiator interactions, we have studied what is involved in negotiating. As a negotiated settlement is presumed to be voluntary, an agreement has to favor everyone. In this book, we have also assumed that negotiating behavior is driven by self-interest; an outcome should bring advantage to all sides. In fact, no rational actor is supposed to agree to a proposal that leaves him/her worse off than the status quo ante. In an economic lexicon, a rational bargaining outcome is represented by a Pareto efficient allocation of values, where a further increase in one party's welfare should not be obtained at the sacrifice of the other's. More importantly, being rational in negotiation translates into making the best decisions to realize one's own objectives or maximize one's own interests (Bazerman and Neale 1992). In that sense, our main interest has not been “getting to yes” (Fisher and Ury 1981).

At the heart of negotiation lies a need to resolve a tension between efficiency and distribution in the outcome (Princen 1992). In a bargaining dilemma, negotiators are caught up in a contradiction between their need for joint action and conflict over the terms of the final agreement (Craver 2012). Cooperation is essential in enhancing efficiency for the maximization of mutual gains, while competition is generated by the existence of many possible outcomes, each favoring a different party. Bargainers can reach an agreement in such a way as to improve their joint welfare by enlarging the pie through cooperation. At the same time, the main impetus of bargaining is to maximize individual total gain, thus creating conditions for a dispute over how to “divide the pie.” Thus concerns for absolute gain do not alleviate interest in seeking equal or greater share than an opponent.

Given the dubious link between individual gain and collective efficiency, opposing parties instinctively prefer to protect or build a competitive edge than to simultaneously pursue joint interests.