We introduce self-divisible ultrafilters, which we prove to be precisely those $w$ such that the weak congruence relation $\equiv _w$ introduced by Šobot is an equivalence relation on $\beta {\mathbb Z}$. We provide several examples and additional characterisations; notably we show that $w$ is self-divisible if and only if $\equiv _w$ coincides with the strong congruence relation $\mathrel {\equiv ^{\mathrm {s}}_{w}}$, if and only if the quotient $(\beta {\mathbb Z},\oplus )/\mathord {\mathrel {\equiv ^{\mathrm {s}}_{w}}}$ is a profinite group. We also construct an ultrafilter $w$ such that $\equiv _w$ fails to be symmetric, and describe the interaction between the aforementioned quotient and the profinite completion $\hat {{\mathbb Z}}$ of the integers.

We study the possible structures which can be carried by sets which have no countable subset, but which fail to be ‘surjectively Dedekind finite’, in two possible senses, that there is surjection to $\omega $, or alternatively, that there is a surjection to a proper superset.

Logical frameworks that are sensitive to features of sentences’ subject-matter—like Berto’s topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs)—demand a maximally faithful model of the topics of sentences. This is an especially difficult task in the case in which topics are assigned to intensional formulae. In two previous papers, a framework was developed whose model of intensional subject-matter could accommodate a wider range of intuitions about particular intensional conditionals. Although resolving a number of counterintuitive features, the work made an implicit assumption that the subject-matter of an intensional conditional is a function of the subject-matters of its subformulae. This assumption—which I will call a principle of topic sufficiency—runs counter to some natural intuitions concerning topic. In this paper, we will investigate topic sufficiency and offer a semantic account that is state-sensitive, providing an implementation through the introduction of topic-sensitive logics related to William Parry’s prototypical $\mathsf {PAI}$.

We formulate Hilbert’s epsilon calculus in the context of expansion proofs. This leads to a simplified proof of the epsilon theorems by disposing of the need for prenexification, Skolemisation, and their respective inverse transformations. We observe that the natural notion of cut in the epsilon calculus is associative.

Orthomodular logic is a weakening of quantum logic in the sense of Birkhoff and von Neumann. Orthomodular logic is shown to be a nonlinear noncommutative logic. Sequents are given a physically motivated semantics that is consistent with exactly one semantics for propositional formulas that use negation, conjunction, and implication. In particular, implication must be interpreted as the Sasaki arrow, which satisfies the deduction theorem in this logic. As an application, this deductive system is extended to two systems of predicate logic: the first is sound for Takeuti’s quantum set theory, and the second is sound for a variant of Weaver’s quantum logic.

We introduce and analyze a new axiomatic theory $\mathsf {CD}$ of truth. The primitive truth predicate can be applied to sentences containing the truth predicate. The theory is thoroughly classical in the sense that $\mathsf {CD}$ is not only formulated in classical logic, but that the axiomatized notion of truth itself is classical: The truth predicate commutes with all quantifiers and connectives, and thus the theory proves that there are no truth value gaps or gluts. To avoid inconsistency, the instances of the T-schema are restricted to determinate sentences. Determinateness is introduced as a further primitive predicate and axiomatized. The semantics and proof theory of $\mathsf {CD}$ are analyzed.

We introduce prime products as a generalization of ultraproducts for positive logic. Prime products are shown to satisfy a version of Łoś’s Theorem restricted to positive formulas, as well as the following variant of the Keisler Isomorphism Theorem: under the generalized continuum hypothesis, two models have the same positive theory if and only if they have isomorphic prime powers of ultrapowers.

We study the position of the computable setting in the “common theory of locality” developed in [4, 5] for local problems on $\Delta $-regular trees, $\Delta \in \omega $. We show that such a problem admits a computable solution on every highly computable $\Delta $-regular forest if and only if it admits a Baire measurable solution on every Borel $\Delta $-regular forest. We also show that if such a problem admits a computable solution on every computable maximum degree $\Delta $ forest then it admits a continuous solution on every maximum degree $\Delta $ Borel graph with appropriate topological hypotheses, though the converse does not hold.

Erdős [7] proved that the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) is equivalent to the existence of an uncountable family $\mathcal {F}$ of (real or complex) analytic functions, such that $\big \{ f(x) \ : \ f \in \mathcal {F} \big \}$ is countable for every x. We strengthen Erdős’ result by proving that CH is equivalent to the existence of what we call sparse analytic systems of functions. We use such systems to construct, assuming CH, an equivalence relation $\sim $ on $\mathbb {R}$ such that any ‘analytic-anonymous’ attempt to predict the map $x \mapsto [x]_\sim $ must fail almost everywhere. This provides a consistently negative answer to a question of Bajpai-Velleman [2].

We generalize the notion of consequence relation standard in abstract treatments of logic to accommodate intuitions of relevance. The guiding idea follows the use criterion, according to which in order for some premises to have some conclusion(s) as consequence(s), the premises must each be used in some way to obtain the conclusion(s). This relevance intuition turns out to require not just a failure of monotonicity, but also a move to considering consequence relations as obtaining between multisets. We motivate and state basic definitions of relevant consequence relations, both in single conclusion (asymmetric) and multiple conclusion (symmetric) settings, as well as derivations and theories, guided by the use intuitions, and prove a number of results indicating that the definitions capture the desired results (at least in many cases).

The present note was prompted by Weber’s approach to proving Cantor’s theorem, i.e., the claim that the cardinality of the power set of a set is always greater than that of the set itself. While I do not contest that his proof succeeds, my point is that he neglects the possibility that by similar methods it can be shown also that no non-empty set satisfies Cantor’s theorem. In this paper unrestricted abstraction based on a cut free Gentzen type sequential calculus will be employed to prove both results. In view of the connection between Priest’s three-valued logic of paradox and cut free Gentzen calculi this, a fortiori, has an impact on any paraconsistent set theory built on Priest’s logic of paradox.

Let $\mathcal {S}$ be a family of nonempty sets with VC-codensity less than $2$. We prove that, if $\mathcal {S}$ has the $(\omega ,2)$-property (for any infinitely many sets in $\mathcal {S}$, at least two among them intersect), then $\mathcal {S}$ can be partitioned into finitely many subfamilies, each with the finite intersection property. If $\mathcal {S}$ is definable in some first-order structure, then these subfamilies can be chosen definable too.

This is a strengthening of the case $q=2$ of the definable $(p,q)$-conjecture in model theory [9] and the Alon–Kleitman–Matoušek $(p,q)$-theorem in combinatorics [6].

Traditionally, the formulae in modal logic express properties of possible worlds. Prior introduced “egocentric” logics that capture properties of agents rather than of possible worlds. In such a setting, the article proposes the modality “know how to tell apart” and gives a complete logical system describing the interplay between this modality and the knowledge modality. An important contribution of this work is a new matrix-based technique for proving completeness theorems in an egocentric setting.

We investigate the effect of adding $\omega _2$ Cohen reals on graphs on $\omega _2$, in particular we show that $\omega _2 \to (\omega _2, \omega : \omega )^2$ holds after forcing with $\mathsf {Add}(\omega , \omega _2)$ in a model of $\mathsf {CH}$. We also prove that this result is in a certain sense optimal as $\mathsf {Add}(\omega , \omega _2)$ forces that $\omega _2 \not \to (\omega _2, \omega : \omega _1)^2$.

We calculate the possible Scott ranks of countable models of Peano arithmetic. We show that no non-standard model can have Scott rank less than $\omega $ and that non-standard models of true arithmetic must have Scott rank greater than $\omega $. Other than that there are no restrictions. By giving a reduction via $\Delta ^{\mathrm {in}}_{1}$ bi-interpretability from the class of linear orderings to the canonical structural $\omega $-jump of models of an arbitrary completion T of $\mathrm {PA}$ we show that every countable ordinal $\alpha>\omega $ is realized as the Scott rank of a model of T.

The uncountability of $\mathbb {R}$ is one of its most basic properties, known far outside of mathematics. Cantor’s 1874 proof of the uncountability of $\mathbb {R}$ even appears in the very first paper on set theory, i.e., a historical milestone. In this paper, we study the uncountability of ${\mathbb R}$ in Kohlenbach’s higher-order Reverse Mathematics (RM for short), in the guise of the following principle:

$$\begin{align*}\mathit{for \ a \ countable \ set } \ A\subset \mathbb{R}, \mathit{\ there \ exists } \ y\in \mathbb{R}\setminus A. \end{align*}$$

An important conceptual observation is that the usual definition of countable set—based on injections or bijections to ${\mathbb N}$—does not seem suitable for the RM-study of mainstream mathematics; we also propose a suitable (equivalent over strong systems) alternative definition of countable set, namely union over ${\mathbb N}$ of finite sets; the latter is known from the literature and closer to how countable sets occur ‘in the wild’. We identify a considerable number of theorems that are equivalent to the centred theorem based on our alternative definition. Perhaps surprisingly, our equivalent theorems involve most basic properties of the Riemann integral, regulated or bounded variation functions, Blumberg’s theorem, and Volterra’s early work circa 1881. Our equivalences are also robust, promoting the uncountability of ${\mathbb R}$ to the status of ‘big’ system in RM.

I discuss problems with Martin-Löf’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in constructive type theory and propose a revision of his views. I maintain that a judgment is analytic when its correctness follows exclusively from the evaluation of the expressions occurring in it. I argue that Martin-Löf’s claim that all judgments of the forms $a : A$ and $a = b : A$ are analytic is unfounded. As I shall show, when A evaluates to a dependent function type $(x : B) \to C$, all judgments of these forms fail to be analytic and therefore end up as synthetic. Going beyond the scope of Martin-Löf’s original distinction, I also argue that all hypothetical judgments are synthetic and show how the analytic–synthetic distinction reworked here is capable of accommodating judgments of the forms $A \> \mathsf {type}$ and $A = B \> \mathsf {type}$ as well. Finally, I consider and reject an alternative account of analyticity as decidability and assess Martin-Löf’s position on the analytic grounding of synthetic judgments.

This paper proves the finite axiomatizability of transitive modal logics of finite depth and finite width w.r.t. proper-successor-equivalence. The frame condition of the latter requires, in a rooted transitive frame, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points with different sets of proper successors. The result generalizes Rybakov’s result of the finite axiomatizability of extensions of $\mathbf {S4}$ of finite depth and finite width.

We show that under $\mathsf {BMM}$ and “there exists a Woodin cardinal,$"$ the nonstationary ideal on $\omega _1$ cannot be defined by a $\Pi _1$ formula with parameter $A \subset \omega _1$. We show that the same conclusion holds under the assumption of Woodin’s $(\ast )$-axiom. We further show that there are universes where $\mathsf {BPFA}$ holds and $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is $\Pi _1(\{\omega _1\})$-definable. Lastly we show that if the canonical inner model with one Woodin cardinal $M_1$ exists, there is a generic extension of $M_1$ in which $\text {NS}_{\omega _1}$ is saturated and $\Pi _1(\{ \omega _1\} )$-definable, and $\mathsf {MA_{\omega _1}}$ holds.

In their logical analysis of theorems about disjoint rays in graphs, Barnes, Shore, and the author (hereafter BGS) introduced a weak choice scheme in second-order arithmetic, called the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of finite choice (hereafter finite choice). This is a special case of the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of choice ($\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$) introduced by Kreisel. BGS showed that $\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$ suffices for proving many of the aforementioned theorems in graph theory. While it is not known if these implications reverse, BGS also showed that those theorems imply finite choice (in some cases, with additional induction assumptions). This motivated us to study the proof-theoretic strength of finite choice. Using a variant of Steel forcing with tagged trees, we show that finite choice is not provable from the $\Delta ^1_1$-comprehension scheme (even over $\omega $-models). We also show that finite choice is a consequence of the arithmetic Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem (introduced by Friedman and studied by Conidis), assuming $\Sigma ^1_1$-induction. Our results were used by BGS to show that several theorems in graph theory cannot be proved using $\Delta ^1_1$-comprehension. Our results also strengthen results of Conidis.