Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of the Peace

Someone will raise doubts, however, about what we have said, objecting that the authority to pass or institute laws does not belong to the universal body of the citizens. Firstly because something that is mostly wicked and undiscerning ought not to establish the law; for these two faults, sc. malice and ignorance, must be excluded from the legislator. Indeed it was in order to avoid them in judgements, as well, that we understood the necessity of laws in chapter 11 of this discourse. But the people or the universal body of the citizens is of this nature; for men are visibly wicked and stupid for the most part, since ‘the number of the stupid is infinite’ as it says in Ecclesiastes 1. Again, because it is very hard or impossible to get the opinions of many wicked and foolish individuals to agree, whereas this is not the case with a few who are virtuous. It is therefore more expedient for law to be passed by a few men rather than by the universal body of the citizens or an unnecessary number of them. Again, in any civil community the wise and the learned are few in respect of the rest of the untaught multitude. Since, therefore, it is more expedient for law to be passed by the wise and learned than by the ignorant and the uneducated, it seems that the authority to pass them belongs to the few, and not to many or to all. Further still, it is in vain for something to be done by many if it can be done by fewer. Since, therefore, it is possible for law to be passed by the wise (who are few) – as said before – it would be in vain for the entire multitude or its greater part to be occupied in this business. The authority to legislate does not, therefore, belong to the universal body of the citizens or its prevailing part.