Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of the Peace

Now since we have said that election is the more perfect and superior way of instituting the principate, we do well to inquire into its efficient cause, sc. that from which, in its full excellence, it must ensue; for the result of this will be that the cause both of elected principate, and similarly of the other parts of the polity, becomes apparent. But because the principate must regulate human civil acts (as we demonstrated in chapter 5 of this discourse), and do this according to a standard that is and should be the form of that which exercises it, it is necessary to inquire into this standard: if there is any such thing, what it is, and what is its purpose. For the efficient cause of the standard may turn out to be the same as that of the prince.

2

We suppose, then – as a thing almost self-evident by induction – that this standard, which is called ‘statute’ or ‘custom’ or by the common term of ‘law’, exists in all perfect communities. Taking this as given, we shall first show what it is. Secondly we shall identify its necessity in terms of its end. Finally we shall determine, through demonstration, by what kind of action, and on the part of what or which agents, it should be instituted. And this will be to inquire into its legislator or active cause; to whom we think that the election of principates also belongs, as we shall show by demonstration in the following chapters. In addition, as a result of these discussions, the matter or subject of the abovementioned standard (which we have called the law) will become apparent. For this is the princely part, to which it belongs to regulate the political or civil acts of men according to law.

3

As we embark on what we have proposed, therefore, it is appropriate to distinguish between the meanings of (or what is signified by) this term ‘law’, so that its multiple senses do not lead to frustration.