Fleming and Michel argue that consciousness lags up to 450 ms behind the world. I argue that the “aquatic sensory volume” for objects ecologically relevant for fish lies outside this window. If “reality monitoring” is an important function of consciousness, it likely evolved well before the transition to land in the vertebrate lineage.

The prioritization of belligerent perspectives at the expense of civilian protection and welfare has a long history in just war theory and practice, from the works of early just war theorists to the legal and scholarly defenses of colonial conquest to the contemporary moral injury discourse. In this article, I show how this history has contributed to the ongoing infliction of devastating harms on civilians, as evidenced in the case studies of drone warfare and the war in Gaza, and I argue for the inclusion and prioritization of noncombatant civilian perspectives in academic, policy, and legal analyses of war. Doing so, as I demonstrate, radically disrupts traditional just war thinking and has important implications for broader social, legal, and policy approaches to armed conflict and its aftermath.

This commentary critiques Fleming and Michel’s “sensory horizons” framework, arguing that it underestimates the fragility and fallibility of conscious vision. Drawing on clinical and neuroscientific evidence, we highlight frequent failures in reality monitoring and affordance perception in psychopathology. We propose that a revised model must integrate predictive processing and neural dysregulation to fully account for both normal and abnormal conscious experience.

Nado.pred že.part! ‘Ça, alors !’ est la manière dont une personne parlant russe pourrait s’exprimer lorsqu’elle est prise de court, lorsqu’elle est frappée de surprise. Cet article propose d’expliquer cet emploi si particulier du modal nado (qui, comme nous le verrons, exprime une forme de nécessité, « il faut ») qui peut, lorsqu’il est utilisé conjointement à la particule énonciative že perdre son expression modale stricte et exprimer alors un ressenti du locuteur à un instant t. Ses usages feront également l’objet d’une analyse et d’une proposition de classification à travers la description d’énoncés russes en contexte.

Fleming & Michel (F&M) argue that the function of perceptual consciousness is to aid unconscious model-based planning. Unfortunately, unconscious model-based planning probably does not exist. F&M therefore face a dilemma: either perceptual consciousness is for conscious model-based planning or it is for something else. We argue that it is for something else.

Plastic pollution from takeout and delivery food packaging is a growing concern, especially in low- and middle-income countries with weak waste management infrastructure and single-use plastics policy. Using a novel metric developed for this research project, this study evaluated the impact of an information intervention on the sustainability of takeout and delivery packaging in Honduran restaurants. In an exploratory randomized controlled trial, managers were offered a 12-hour online course, with packaging sustainability measured before and after. Sustainability decreased in both the control and treatment groups, with no significant treatment effects.

We argue that evolutionarily conserved processing of visual information via subcortical routes persists in humans despite the emergence of cortical networks for conscious visual perception and the rapid visual control of planned actions. These cortical circuits did not replace subcortical circuits but instead evolved the capacity to preset the nested subcortical circuits to enable (or suppress) fast-as-possible actions, when required.

Fleming and Michel propose that as our evolutionary ancestors made the water-to-land transition, model-based, conscious planning and thought developed alongside the model-free, unconscious, reflexive behaviors that were sufficient in aquatic environments. But a century of research has failed to build a compelling body of replicable evidence that behavior can be controlled unconsciously in humans, severely undermining this theory.

In cases of isolated left brachiocephalic artery, if both ductus arteriosus remain patent, excessive pulmonary blood flow can occur, and cerebral perfusion may be compromised by a steal phenomenon, potentially leading to cerebral atrophy. We report a case of an isolated left brachiocephalic artery with bilateral patent ductus arteriosus in which transcatheter closure of both ductus arteriosus was successfully performed.

Fleming and Michel propose that conscious vision evolved as a result of the water-to-land transition of animal life, enabling what they call “reality monitoring.” Here, we challenge their account by drawing on evolutionary arguments and the sensory capacities of aquatic life. Consciousness, we suggest, may have deeper evolutionary roots with significant roles for “slow” decision-making.

This article explores support for Black Lives Matter through the lens of intergroup conflict and solidarity—concepts at the core of Paula D. McClain’s research. We examine the extent to which expressions of “American identity” amplify support for or opposition to the Black Lives Matter movement. The merits of protest are perceived differently across racial groups in the United States, but theories of superordinate identity suggest attitudes could be unified through common expressions of a shared identity. Using 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey data (N=3,711; sum of Black and white respondents), we employ multivariate regression analysis to show that although Black and white respondents express similarly strong levels of a superordinate “American identity,” American identity moderates Black and white support for Black Lives Matter inconsistently—and at times in opposing directions. These findings provide additional context for understanding how American identity relates to support for protest activity, suggesting that American identity can assume distinct meanings for different groups of Americans.

Bargaining requires agents to negotiate normative principles amid disagreement, incomplete information, and shifting social contexts, making uncertainty about moral rules and frameworks inherent to the decision process. In this commentary, I highlight the need for understanding how individuals resolve moral disagreements not just by applying fixed principles, but by navigating the uncertainty of which moral framework to adopt.

How can a political society established in one port city in Revolutionary France be a ‘global’ actor? This article examines the revolutionary Society of Lorient, an Atlantic port founded to be the seat of the French East India Company, as a case study of the viability of the ‘micro-spatial’ approach to global history outlined by Christian De Vito. It considers how the Lorient Society positioned itself as an intermediary between global concerns and the French national authorities, as well as the Society’s evolving perspective on global imperial rivalries in their relationship to revolution, the ‘rights of man’, trade, war, race, and slavery. In doing so, it shows how a seemingly local actor could help construct the global in the context of the ‘Age of Revolution(s)’ of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Explaining altruistic behavior may require expanding the bargaining framework. In particular, accommodating altruism may require greater emphasis on bargaining under normative rather than actual conditions. Fleshing out the account of resource-rational bargaining under normative conditions raises important questions for future research.

By targeting treatment according to molecular biomarkers, precision medicine promises a revolution in health care. We examine this promise by distinguishing three precision medicine strategies: biomarker-stratified high-risk-targeting, biomarker-based individual targeting, and biomarker-based disease targeting. Each strategy seeks to boost one of the determinants of the population impact of a medical intervention. We conclude that these strategies give a molecular coating to decades-old tactics. There is no compelling reason to believe that precision medicine strategies are uniquely effective for sick individuals or sick populations.