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This chapter examines how conservative parties strategically adapt their political appeals in response to the constraints imposed by globalization. Confronted with the challenge of reconciling their long-standing commitments to market liberalism with rising voter demands for protection and control, these parties increasingly adopt populist rhetoric to reshape the terms of political competition. Rather than abandoning core economic positions, conservative parties shift their emphasis to anti-elite, nationalist, and antiglobalist themes, recasting political debates around identity, sovereignty, and cultural belonging. These rhetorical strategies allow them to deflect attention from unpopular policy continuities and channel voter discontent away from economic grievances and toward external threats or internal scapegoats. The chapter argues that this populist turn reflects a calculated political adaptation rather than ideological transformation. It highlights how globalization not only reshapes the policy space available to democratic governments but also incentivizes new forms of narrative construction and voter persuasion, particularly among mainstream parties seeking to preserve broad electoral coalitions.
While hot spots of crime have become an important focus of study in criminology and an important focus of crime prevention in programs like hot spots policing, to date we know little about these places. Who lives in hot spots of crime? What factors lead to these places becoming crime hot spots? What other social and health problems are found in these places? The book draws on more than 7,000 surveys of people living on crime hot spot and non-hot spot streets, systematic physical and social observations, and structured qualitative data collection. The results of this study illustrate that hot spots of crime are not just hot spots for crime, but also many other social ills. By shedding light on the social features of hot spots of crime, the book recognizes the importance of informal social controls in understanding and preventing crime at crime hot spots. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter concludes the book by reflecting on the implications of the findings for democratic representation in a globalized world. It argues that globalization has introduced structural constraints that alter the relationship between voters and elected representatives, compelling mainstream parties to adapt their electoral strategies in ways that threaten democratic accountability. The chapter ties together insights from the cross-national analyses, survey experiments, and in-depth case studies to show how parties recalibrate their promises, adopt ambiguous or populist rhetoric, and shift responsibility for broken pledges to external actors. It emphasizes that although these strategies may be electorally rational, they can erode the clarity of democratic choice and the mechanisms through which voters hold politicians accountable. The chapter closes by discussing the normative and institutional implications for democratic resilience and responsiveness in an era of enduring international interdependence.
This chapter introduces the concept of promissory representation: the idea that democratic accountability hinges on political actors making and keeping campaign promises. We trace the development of this concept through key scholarly contributions, distinguishing between mandate and trustee models of representation, and arguing that the former provides stronger mechanisms of accountability. We also address several critiques: that voters may not remember promises, lack the information to evaluate fulfillment, or prioritize other factors. Drawing on comparative research, particularly from the Comparative Pledges Project, we show that election promises remain central to democratic politics and that voters do consider promise fulfillment when evaluating parties. We also discuss how ideology and partisanship shape these assessments and argue that promissory representation remains a valuable framework for understanding the effects of globalization on democratic accountability.
Ryan Jablonski's Dependency Politics examines how democracy works in aid-dependent countries. He draws on over six years of fieldwork to investigate relationships between donors and politicians, showing how politicians make policy and how aid dependency changes voters' assessments of politician performance. He reveals that voters don't simply reward politicians for aid, rather they condition their votes on beliefs about how politicians influence aid delivery. This leads to a 'visibility-uncertainty' paradox where aid can either enhance or erode democratic accountability. Revisiting assumptions about the effects of foreign aid on political behavior, he also explains how aid can cause citizens to vote against their interests and sometimes benefit opposition candidates over incumbents. Drawing on surveys, interviews, focus groups, and field experiments, Jablonski challenges conventional wisdom about foreign aid and offers lessons for balancing trade-offs over aid effectiveness, political capture and capacity-building. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Chapter 9 investigates how political parties strategically use ambiguity in their campaign pledges to navigate the policy constraints imposed by globalization. As international integration limits domestic policy discretion, parties – particularly those in government – face a dilemma: how to appeal to voters while avoiding promises they may be unable to fulfill. This chapter combines observational evidence with original cross-national data on pledge clarity to demonstrate that parties increasingly rely on ambiguous language to maintain electoral appeal while reducing the risks of future accountability. The analysis reveals that this trend is most pronounced for governing parties and those operating in highly globalized economies, where the tension between responsiveness and responsibility is particularly acute. Rather than abandoning pledges entirely, these parties blur their commitments, complicating voters’ ability to hold them accountable and thereby altering the democratic chain of delegation. Ambiguity thus emerges not as a signal of incompetence or deception but as a strategic adaptation to the pressures of international economic interdependence.
This chapter presents a qualitative case study of the UK Conservative Party’s failed 2010 pledge to reduce net migration below 100,000. It probes the mechanisms through which globalization constrains promise fulfillment by focusing on this paradigmatic broken promise. The analysis shows how international legal commitments (especially EU free movement rules), the economic imperative for labor mobility, and political pressures from both market actors and voters made the pledge untenable. Drawing on elite interviews and archival evidence, the chapter traces how economic integration and institutional entanglement restricted the UK government’s policy autonomy despite its electoral mandate. This typical case illustrates how globalization creates cross-cutting pressures that lead governing parties to abandon salient, repeated promises. The case demonstrates how external constraints interact with domestic political incentives to produce broken promises, while contributing to rising public dissatisfaction and support for radical alternatives like Brexit.
This chapter explores how globalization constrains the policy autonomy of democratic governments and introduces a typology of four mechanisms that affect their ability to fulfill campaign promises: international legal obligations, market actors, citizens’ expectations, and economic uncertainty. These constraints are not evenly distributed: left-leaning parties are particularly vulnerable due to their typically expansionary agendas, whereas right-leaning parties are more aligned with market preferences. The chapter argues that globalization alters the cost–benefit calculus of promise making, and that parties often make promises knowing they may be difficult to keep, either due to informational uncertainty or strategic electoral incentives. These dynamics complicate the relationship between citizens and their governments, raising questions about the viability of promissory representation under global economic interdependence. This conceptual framework sets the stage for the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters.
International organizations (IOs) play a central role in contemporary international law-making: they institutionalize most of the processes through which international law is adopted today. From the perspective of the democratic legitimacy of international law, this raises the question of the conditions under which those IOs may be regarded as democratic representatives of their Member States' peoples. Curiously, given its important international and domestic stakes, however, the democratic representativeness of IOs, but also of States and other public and private institutions within those IOs does not seem to be much of a concern in practice. Even more curiously, and by contrast to other issues of democratic legitimacy it is necessarily related to, such as participation or deliberation inside IOs, representation has only rarely been addressed as such in scholarly debates. It is this gap in theory and practice that this volume purports to fill. It is the first one bringing global democracy theorists and international lawyers into dialogue on the topic and in English language. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
This Element argues that the 2008 financial crisis marked a turning point for populism in Europe by extending economic insecurity to the middle class. As insecurity spread, trust in institutions and markets declined, bringing a large new group of disillusioned voters into the political arena. The authors show that this expansion of middle-class anxiety accounts for a substantial share of the rise in populist voting. The political impact was strongest in countries with limited fiscal space, where governments lacked credible tools to cushion economic losses. As voters' demand for protection grew, both new and established parties adjusted their platforms, with populist and protectionist positions becoming more prominent. Using a novel empirical strategy based on differences in occupational exposure to financial constraints, the authors identify the causal effect of crisis-driven insecurity and explain why populism has persisted in European politics. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.